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ABSTRACT
Access control of computing systems is considered a key issue among
Information Systems managers. There are different methods available to
computing systems to ensure a proper authentication of a user. Authentication
mechanisms can use simple user-generated passwords to complicated
combinations of passwords and physical characteristics of the user (i.e., voice
recognition device, retina scanner, signature recognition device, etc.).
This thesis looks at the various authentication mechanisms available to a
security manager. It describes how different authentication mechanisms
operate and the advantages and disadvantages associated with each
mechanism. It also reports on several commercially available software products
that support the user authentication process. Finally, a discussion of
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I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of computer technology has bred
opportunities for ill-intentioned individuals to violate the
integrity and validity of computer-based information systems
(IS). At the same time, a growing dependence on computer-
based information systems creates an urgent need to collect
information and render it accessible. (Zviran and Haga , 1990a)
The developments in computers and communications
technologies in the last two decades has made most
organizations susceptible to misuse or abuse of computer-based
information systems. While information systems can provide an
improvement in an organization's functioning and enhance its
services, they can also expose that organization to greater
risks as they become more dependent on information resources.
Recent surveys of top IS management issues indicate that
security is considered a top concern (Brancheau and Wetherbe
,
1987; Dickson et al , 1983). Therefore, the amount of
information security that an organization requires to protect
its computing facilities and information resources is a key
management issue (Wilson et al . , 1990).
It is believed that only about 15 percent of computer
crime ever comes to the attention of law enforcement agencies
(Carroll, 1987). According to recent studies, American
businesses lose $3-5 billion each year in computer fraud
(Lewis, 1987). In England, a report issued by the Audit
Commission indicates that companies are still ignoring the
threat posed by poor computer security (Lauchlan, 1991). This
report recounts that 40% of all breaches of security reported
involve computer fraud (Lauchlan, 1991).
Access control ensures that unauthorized users do not gain
entry into a computer system, as well as preventing a
legitimate user from performing a function inside the system
that he/she is not allowed to do (Wood, 1983). An IS manager
can approach access control with external and internal
methods. External mechanisms include such methods as making
physical access difficult by use of guards, locks, or some
type of token (Ahituv et ai
.
, 1987). Internal controls are
aimed to prevent unauthorized tampering with data. These
controls are designed to prevent users from accessing segments
of memory to which they are prohibited. While access control
is one way of providing internal security and control, there
are other specific approaches that can be used in conjunction
with access controls to prevent an unintended intruder
(Denning and Denning, 1979).
The focus of this thesis is to survey the various user
authentication mechanisms for improving computer security.
Chapter II is an overview of user authentication and a
description of authentication mechanisms and their importance.
Chapters III and IV deal with traditional and advanced
password mechanisms respectively. These chapters describe the
characteristics of user-generated passwords, machine-generated
passwords, passphrases, authentication by word association,
cognitive passwords, and authentication servers and discuss
their advantages and limitations. Chapter V is an evaluation
of traditional password and advanced password mechanisms.
Chapter VI discusses current password use in practice.
Alternative authentication mechanisms are discussed in Chapter
VII, to include automatic call-back, procedures, authentication
servers, token and smart card use, and information on
biometrics. Chapter VIII includes a discussions on password
encryption and the use of various commercially available
software products that can assist an IS security manager in
strengthening an organization's authentication procedures.
Finally, Chapter IX deals with password use in the military.
This chapter focuses on National Security Agency (NSA)
guidelines for password use, as well as similarities and
differences between civilian and military applications.
II. USER AUTHENTICATION OVERVIEW
A. AUTHENTICATION OVERVIEW
User identification is the process by which an individual
identifies himself or herself to a computer-based information
system as a valid user. User Authentication is the procedure
by which a user establishes that he or she is indeed that
user, and has the right to use the system or portions of it.
A simple authentication system can effectively prevent the
casual prowler from poring through the system. (Hutt, 1988)
Most operating systems have applied stringent security
measures to lock out illegal users before they can access
system resources. User authentication mechanisms are an
important ingredient in these security schemes.
Authentication mechanisms are divided into three
categories
:
• What they know, such as a password or an encryption key
• What they possess, such as a token or a capability
• Something about you , such as a picture or a fingerprint
(Wood, 1983; Spender, 1987; Weiss, 1990)
Authentication usually operates in the following manner:
a user enters some piece of identification, such as a name or
an assigned user-ID. This identification can be available to
the public (e.g., when it also serves as the user's e-mail
identification) or easy to guess (e.g., a user's first name).
Thus, it does not provide security for the system. To
authenticate a user, the system requests further information
(e.g.
,
a password) . If the authentication information matches
that on file for the user, the user is granted access to the
system. A mismatch leads to a denial of access (Wood, 1983).
Use of ATMs is an example of a combination of something a user
has (a plastic card) and something a user knows: the Personal
Identification Number (PIN), which serves as a password.
B. AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS
Several authentication mechanisms are available to
computer users. The most common mechanism used today is a
password. Traditional password mechanisms fall into two
categories: user-generated or system-generated. More advanced
password schemes include passphrases, associative passwords,
cognitive passwords and authentication servers. Alternative
authentication mechanisms include automatic call-back
procedures, authentication servers, tokens and smart cards,
and biometric devices.
Some authentication procedures are purposely slow.
However, while it is not inconvenient for a legitimate user if
the authentication procedure takes 5 to 10 seconds, a brute
force attack on a system that requires 5 or 10 seconds per
attempt makes this class of attack generally infeasible.
(Pfleeger, 1989)
There are other ways to discourage unauthorized users. If
someone fails to log-in after several attempts, it is common
for the system to disconnect, forcing a user to reestablish a
connection with the system. This method will slow down a
penetrator from attacking the system.
In a more secure environment, stopping a penetrator may be
more important than tolerating users' mistakes. In such cases
a system may limit password entries to three tries, assuming
that legitimate users can type their passwords correctly
within three tries. After a third successive password
failure, the account is disabled, and can only be reenabled by
the security administrator. This action, while inconvenient
due to denial of services, may help in identifying accounts
that may be the target of attacks by penetrations.
The underlying assumption in password authentication
assumes that only a user to whom the password belongs knows
it. However, passwords can be guessed, deduced, or inferred.
One method of uncovering a users password is to simply ask
him/her for it. Other passwords have been obtained by
watching a user typing in his/her password. This causes flaws
in the authentication process. (Menkus, 1988)
Advanced password mechanisms help eliminate the way an
intruder can obtain a password. By requiring more than a
single password, advanced authentication mechanisms provide a
level of security that is desirable to many IS organizations.
In addition to passwords, there are several alternative
mechanisms available to assist user authentication. These
include tokens, smart cards and biometric devices such as
handprint detectors, voice recognizers, and identifiers of
patterns in the retina. Although expensive and in some cases
still experimental, these devices are useful in very high
security situations. (Wilson, 1987)
The next chapters discusses the various authentication
mechanisms, providing definitions, examples, and analysis of
their advantages and disadvantages.
III. TRADITIONAL PASSWORD MECHANISMS
A. PASSWORD OVERVIEW
A basic access control routine in any computer operated
system is to ensure proper user authentication. The most
commonly used authentication method is the password.
Developers of password access control packages have used an
analogy of a fence or wall protecting a valued physical asset.
Once a user has presented the correct password, he or she
essentially passes over this logical fence and gains access to
the information system (Wood, 1987). In a large number of
computer systems, passwords are the first line of defense
against unauthorized persons trying to gain access to computer
resources. Sometimes it might be the only line of defense.
As such it is imperative that this defense be as formidable as
possible (Wood, 1983).
Passwords are formally defined as "any sequence of
letters, numbers, special symbols, or control symbol
s
,... non-
printing, that are used to authenticate a computer user's
identity". (Riddle et al
.
, 1989)
In some cases a user chooses a password, while in others
a password is assigned by the system. The composition of
passwords varies from system to system. The effectiveness of
a password is dependent on the balance to be struck between
the ease with which it can be remembered and the difficulty
with which it can be guessed by an unauthorized party. In
theory, the only person who should know the user's password is
the user. (Riddle et al., 1989)
Passwords are considered to be of limited usefulness as
protection devices because of the relatively small number of
bits of information they contain. However, despite horror
stories associated with password use, researchers say that
passwords can provide ample security if managed and handled
properly. (Betts, 1985)
An underlying goal of password security is to cause
minimum inconvenience to users. As the first line of defense,
a password security system should prevent unauthorized entries
as well as preventing authorized users from engaging in
unauthorized activities. (Morris and Thompson, 1979; Jobusch
and Oldehoeft, 1989; Riddle et al
.
, 1989)
Passwords should be hard to guess and hard to determine
exhaustively. A fundamental dilemma of password selection is
that easily remembered passwords are easy to guess; the hard-
to-remember passwords get written down and therefore can be
misused or stolen. (Highland, 1990)
In the case of an occasionally mistype of passwords, a
user should receive a message of INCORRECT LOG-IN at which
point the log-in procedure should be repeated to gain access
to the system. Even the worst typist should be able to log-in
successfully in three to five attempts. (Menkus, 1988)
Operating systems often encourage users to change their
passwords regularly. Password aging, or the enforcement of a
maximum password lifetime is one method of automatically
forcing users to change their passwords. Such mechanisms can
typically enforce a minimum and maximum amount of time between
password changes. The regularity of password change is
usually a system parameter, which can be changed for a given
instal lation .
While password aging may seem like a good idea, many argue
that it is counter-productive. Users do not like to change
passwords; systems requiring them to do so may cause
frustration. Mechanisms that do not warn of an upcoming
expiration of the password can actually decrease security, as
such a mechanism may suddenly demand that a new password be
set. Such practices will probably not result in the best
password choice, and most likely will be written down as well.
Systems supporting minimum lifetimes can actually stop users
from changing their passwords. Minimum lifetimes are
primarily used to keep users from "cheating" the aging system,
by changing to a temporary password, and then back to the old
one (Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989).
Changes should be made periodically, depending on the
security classification of the information to which they
afford access. Passwords to special control information
should be used once only. Passwords to confidential
information should be changed daily. Passwords to private
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information should be changed weekly. Other passwords can be
changed as desired, but this should be done no less frequently
than once every six months. (Carroll, 1987)
Auditing, when used with password mechanisms, is used to
record events that occur during authentication attempts.
Information collected by auditing software includes:
• successful log-in and log-out information
• unsuccessful log-in information
successful password changes
• unsuccessful password changes
• number of currently active sessions. (Jobusch and
Oldehoeft, 1989)
Using this information provides a method of detecting a
perpetrator using a stolen account, as well as attempted
breakins. Audit information can also be used to deactivate a
port or a username if a high rate of authentication failure is
detected. (Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989)
Monitoring of a password system should not be left to
those times when serious violation occurs. Even though this
operation might be repetitive and boring, it is essential to
maintaining security. (Highland, 1990)
B. USER-GENERATED PASSWORDS
Since a password has to be remembered, people tend to pick
simple passwords (Pfleeger, 1989). If a user is picking a
11
password, he or she is probably not choosing a word completely
at random. Most likely a user's password is something
meaningful to him or her. People typically choose personal
passwords, such as the name of a spouse, a child, a brother or
sister, a pet, a street name, or something similar.
It would be easy to select a password by picking two short
words and separating them by punctuation, digits or control









Another route to strong passwords is to select a common
and easily remembered phrase, eliminating the spaces between
words and truncating after the required number of characters.
Here are some examples: "He is a dud" becomes "heisadud,"
"Peter Piper" becomes "peterpip, " and "floppy disk" becomes
"f loppydi .
"
Foreign languages also work very well as passwords. For
example, try "thank you" or some other phrase in the foreign
language. Or truncate a translation as necessary. (Highland,
1990)
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Practical guidelines regarding password selection include:
Use more then A-Z . When using A-Z, there are only 26
possibilities per character. Adding digits expands the
number of possibilities per character to 36. Using both
upper and lower case letters plus digits expands the
number of possibilities per character to 62.
Choose long passwords . The combinatorial explosion of
passwords begins at length 4 or 5 . Choosing 6-character
or longer passwords makes it less likely that a password
will be uncovered.
Avoid actual names or words. Theoretically there are
about 300 million "words" (i.e. any combination of
characters) of length 6, but there are only about 150,000
words in a good collegiate dictionary, ignoring length.
Choose an unlikely password. In order to remember the
password easily, you want one that has special meaning.
However, you don't want someone else to be able to guess
this special meaning.
Chang e the password regularl y . Even if there is no reason
to suspect that the password has been compromised, change
is advised.
Don't write it down.
Don't te ll anyone . (Pfleeger, 1989)
User-generated passwords are popular because they are
conceptually simple, relatively inexpensive, easy to
administer, and user friendly. (Wood, 1990)
Disadvantages of user-generated passwords are many.
First, if a user makes the password as secure as possible, he
or she tends to write it down so as not to forget it. By
doing so a user is leaving it open to compromise. Second, if
a user does not put effort into selecting a password by
choosing a familiar name or trivial association it makes it
13
easy for an intruder to figure out. Third, even if a good
password is chosen, if a user keys it in slowly or allows
someone to watch as it is keyed in, it is then subject to
compromise. And finally, there are many ways for an intruder
to unfold an operating system in order to find the password
table and decipher it or use some method to capture the




A password generator is a program that creates strings to
be used for machine-generated passwords. Such programs are
made available on systems in an effort to ensure "good"
password choices. How to design a password generator that
produces passwords that are both difficult to guess and easy
for a user to remember is not immediately apparent. While it
is easy to generate random strings to be used as passwords,
they most likely will not be easy for a user to remember.
Also, password generators that are not sufficiently random in
the method in which they select passwords may be limited in
the number of passwords they can generate. (Jobusch and
Oldehoeft, 1989)
A password generator that can produce pronounceable
passwords is desirable, as these passwords are more likely to
be remembered than a random string of characters. Such a
system depends on a set of rules that "define" what
pronounceable means. A sample set of rules may include:
14
a consonant must be followed by a vowel ot any type
a vowel may be followed by a vowel of a different type, or
by a consonant
never have more than two consecutive vowels of any type.
(Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989)
Typically, a random number generator is used to select
random letters or groups of letters that are considered
pronounceable. These groups of letters are then linked
together to form the password. While the resulting word" may
not be recognizable, it should be pronounceable in the way it
is constructed. (Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989)
Machine-generated passwords are attractive because they
can ensure that passwords are relatively strong (Wood, 1990).
It is far easier to maintain control over password selection
in a system wherein passwords are machine-generated and
assigned to users than one in which users may select their own
passwords (Highland, 1990).
Unfortunately, the disadvantage is that such passwords are
difficult for a user to remember and because of that they run
a greater risk of compromise (Highland, 1990; Wood, 1990).
This difficulty leads to two problems. First, a user who
forgets his or her password must bother the system manager for
a new one. Secondly, one important security dictum says,
Never write down your password." In machine-generated
password systems there is no effective way of keeping users
from violating the dictum (Highland, 1990; Wood, 1990).
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Machine-generated passwords are also problematic because
the results of some pseudo-random number generators used to
produce them are readily reproducible by an informed opponent
who has access to the algorithm employed. To make matters
worse, in an attempt to generate pronounceable words, many
machine-generated password mechanisms significantly reduce the
number of possible passwords. This reduced pool from which to
pick machine-generated passwords in turn reduces the required
effort to guess a valid password. (Wood, 1990; Bishop, 1991)
Because this fact of human nature, some security directors
have decided to stop using machine-generated passwords and go
back to user-selected ones (Highland, 1990).
D. PROBLEMS WITH TRADITIONAL PASSWORDS
There are several problems associated with traditional
password mechanisms. First, passwords can be intercepted at
the point of entry. With most systems the password is not
displayed as it is entered, so an interceptor must watch your
fingers as opposed to the screen (Betts, 1985). Even by
watching your fingers, if the interceptor can not get all the
characters he maybe able to pickup the pattern for entry.
Even such information as left-right-right-shift-left-number
would substantially reduce the possible passwords to try
(Avarne, 1988) .
Second, passwords are in the clear from the moment they
are entered until the moment they are accepted by the host
16
computer. Therefore, if someone has tapped into the
communication line in a network, they can intercept a user's
password. Tricking novice users with false log-in programs
that steal passwords is another way of abusing insecure
communication lines. Such programs point out another
transmission concern: how do users know if they are really
communicating with the host? Outside of using secure and/or
encrypted communication lines, the insecure transmission of
password information can be a serious weakness in any password
mechanism. (Jobusch et al., 1989)
Traditional passwords discussed in this chapter have three
fundamental weakness. They are:
• They can often be guessed.
• They are entered in the clear.
• They are used more than once. (Avarne, 1988
)
All of these problems occur because a traditional password
is static. Frequent change of passwords are desirable. To
foil these kinds of attacks, the password has to be changed
almost immediately after it is used. Few human users can
handle so frequent password changes and so only change
passwords when required by the system. (Pfleeger, 1989)
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The password schemes examined in the next chapter try to
alleviate these weaknesses. Chapter IV deals with more
advanced schemes for password security including passphrases
and question and answer schemes. Question and answer schemes
include word association and cognitive passwords.
18
IV. ADVANCED SCHEMES FOR PASSWORD SECURITY
Advanced password security schemes are more than just a
string of several alpha-numeric characters. They may include
a series of questions and answers or may be a passphrase that
a user must recall in order for the authentication process to
be completed. Figure 2. depicts the various types of advanced
password schemes .
The advantage of an advanced scheme is it can provide
better security for computer systems than traditional password
schemes (Smith, 1987; Zviran and Haga , 1990b).
ADVANCED PASSWORD SCHEMES
J_
PASSPHRASES! QUESTION AND ANSWER
WORD ASSOCIATION I COGNITIVE PASSWORDS
. , i i
. ,
Figure 2. Advanced Password Schemes
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A. PASSPHRASES
A passphrase is one form of authentication that is just a
longer version of a password. It involves arbitrary selection
of easily remembered, but very likely to be meaningless, three
or tour word phrase from previously defined lists of
adjectives, nouns, verbs and such. An example of a passphrase
might be "big girls drink wine." A passphrase is used as
though it were a single password. (Menkus, 1988)
When users select their own passwords, they are more
likely to remember them, but chosen passwords can often be
easily guessed. Thus, if passwords are generated with the use
of a pseudo-random number generator that include both letters,
numbers, and control characters, they are considerably more
secure, although unpopular with users. Passphrases then seem
to be a relatively attractive compromise between ease-of-use
and high security. (Wood, 1983)
Passphrases are easily to remember because they are user
selected and are more than just as random collection of
characters. But there are problems associated with
passphrases. Even though a user may recall the passphrase
without writing it down, a frequent user may become upset at
the prospect of typing such a long string of characters every
time they desire to use the system (Porter, 1982). Therefore
systems should not require a minimum password length that is
unreasonably long. Passphrases may in fact be an inadequate
means of authentication for frequent users (too long) but can
20
prove useful to those who experience long intervals between
1 og-ons
.
Another problem with passphrases is the same as with
simple passwords, passphrases may need to be checked for
triviality; choices like "mary had a little lamb" will most
likely be guessed (Porter, 1982; Jobusch et al., 1989).
B. WORD ASSOCIATION
The practical need of computer security is to identify
users quickly and reliably by some process which does not
handicap effective computer use. For that purpose a test is
needed with several characteristics. The test must elicit
individualistic responses from different users, so it can
identify any particular user quickly. The test should be
based on easily remembered material, so that it imposes little
memory burden on a user and can be reliably administered. And
ideally the test, by its nature, should elicit user interest
and cooperation rather than resentment. The key to meeting
these requirements is to devise a test that enlists the
cooperation of users themselves. (Smith, 1987j
One promising approach for verifying user identity would
be a question and answer test called word association. But it
must be a personalized test whose contents are specified by
each individual user, rather than one general test applied by
the computer to all users. Word association can be unique to
an individual, if they are chosen for that purpose (i.e.
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avoiding such common associations as "black-white"). Word
association could be quite strong, and if chosen carefully
could be remembered without particular effort. And if each
user is permitted to specify his/her own association, there
would be very little user resistance expected to this kind of
testing
.
Word association would work in the following manner. At
initial enrollment a new user is asked to provide the computer
with a list of 20 cues (words or phrases) along with a
response that the user associates with each one. The computer
would store those cue-response association safely away. Then
on subsequent attempts to access the computer, the computer
would select a cue at random and challenge the candidate user
to give the stored response, repeating that process as
necessary to confirm the user's claimed identity. Depending
upon the computer assessment of risk a user might be required
to give one response or several, but presumably not all 20.
(Smith, 1987)
The cue list would look different for every user. A cue
list and response list could be generated by a user in less
then 30 minutes. The critical decision in creating a list is
to choose a context in which associations are already
established. Probably most people will find it easier to
remember associations if they choose single integrating
context for their entire list, although that is not strictly
necessary to the process.
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Users should select single word responses for greater
certainty of memory and for greater ease of entry in response
to displayed cues.
Most users have rich associations with people and places,
and thus it is probable that most spontaneously created cue
lists would have proper names as their specified responses.
However, that is not strictly necessary to the process; as a
response the user could choose any word that he/she is
reasonably certain to remember. It is not necessary that a
response be "correct" in any sense except that it matches
whatever response was initially stored for that cue. To pass
this test, the user does not have to remember the state flower
of Alaska or any other factual data. Note also that a users
personal association will not necessarily correspond to
general stereotypes. (Smith, 1987)
Smith conducted tests six months after users provided a
list of cues and responses to test the ease with which word
association could be remembered. When asked to reproduce
their cue list most people had problems recalling the list.
One person could not remember any of the cues . The others
each managed to remember some, although not with complete
accuracy
.
These people were then each shown their original cue lists
and asked to recall the correct responses. They remembered
almost all responses correctly and with little difficulty,
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averaging 94 percent correct, indicating persistent strength
of their word associations even after a six-month interval
.
Twelve months later (i.e. 18 months after list creation),
the same people were tested again. They were first asked to
recall the cues that they had devised, which they could do
with only partial success. They were then asked to recall
responses to their original cue lists, which they could still
do with reasonably good accuracy, averaging 86 percent
correct. (Smith, 1987)
Good recollection of such word association could be
expected on several grounds. The responses were cued, which
should aid recall. The material to be remembered was
generated originally by each individual tested, and self-
generation is know to aid recall (McFarland et al .
, 1980;
Slamecka and Graf, 1978). Most responses reflected personal




Assessing memory after such long periods of disuse
represents an extreme test. In reality, a user's memory would
be tested more frequently, perhaps as often as daily or even
more frequent with certain users. Thus through repeated use
many users would come to remember the cues as well as the
responses. On the other hand users need not remember the cues
for associative testing to work. Certainly a user would not
need any printed record of his/her cue list, nor any display
of the entire list except perhaps when changing it. And there
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would be no need to display for any purpose the stored
responses that have been specified for cues.
User may at times forget the proper response to a
particular cue. If that were to happen, the user presumably
could authenticate his/her identity by responding correctly to
several other cues, however many the computer logic might
impose in the interest of adequate security.
Authenticated users should be able to change their cue
lists from time to time, just as they might change a password.
Thus if a user noticed that a particular association was not
easily remembered, he/she might choose to change it. Or
perhaps the computer could keep track of user errors and draw
a troublesome association to a user's attention for potential
revision. It is possible that with changing interests a user
might wish to change a list simply because it has become
boring
.
Considered overall, the potential value of word
association for user authentication seems promising. This
method imposes only modest demands on the user, and it would
require relatively little computer logic to implement. Simple
interactive software routines that would accomplish the basic
functions of initial user enrollment, subsequent cue-response
exchange for authenticating user identity, and occasional user
revision of stored cue lists and associated responses would be
needed. More complex software might be needed for risk
assessment, flexibly controlling the stringency of
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authentication procedures. But a simple matching logic will
suffice to process the word associations on which user
authentication is based. (Smith, 1987)
C. COGNITIVE PASSWORDS
Cognitive passwords as a security scheme evolved from
Smith's (1987) work with word association. Instead of
challenging a user with a single list of word association
cues, cognitive passwords challenge a user with a set of five
randomly selected cognitive questions out of a pre-selected
set of questions and answers (Zviran and Haga , 1990b).
Cognitive password systems and word association systems
are similar in that they both ask a user to provide the data
upon which their passwords are based. The password challenges
consist of fact-based and opinion-based cognitive data that
only a user should know. A fact-based question asks a user
something that the user knows but which is a fact independent
of any feeling about it. For example, "What is the name of
the elementary school that you last attended?". An opinion-
based cognitive item asks for an opinion about something:
"What is your favorite type of music?" or "What is your
favorite flower?"
A cognitive password system will combine both user-
generated and system-generated characteristics. It is system-
generated in that the security administrator creates question
that would be used to generate a response from a user. The
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exact response to these questions would be entirely user-
generated. Hence, a cognitive password system is basically an
access quiz. If the user responds correctly to a series of
questions concerning him/herself, he/she would then be
authorized access to the computer system. (Zviran and Haga
,
1990b)
There are several advantages associated with a cognitive
password system. First, since the cognitive password is
significant to the user, but not readily associated with him
or her, it is easy for a user to remember, but difficult for
an intruder to guess. Second, the responses may be of such
length that a brute force attack would be thwarted. And
finally, a cognitive password system requires several
questions to be answered correctly, so this layering adds an
additional degree of security.
There are also several disadvantages associated with a
cognitive password system. First, users of the traditional
password system have a tendency to forget a single password,
therefore remembering many cognitive passwords would seem to
be harder for the user. Secondly, it is unlikely that a user
would remember all of his responses so establishing an
acceptable miss percentage may be difficult to do. If it is
set to low, an intruder may penetrate the system; if it is set
to high, authorized users may be denied access. (Haga et al.,
1989)
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V. EVALUATING PASSWORD MECHANISMS
Several studies have been conducted to determine the
memorability of traditional password and advanced password
mechanisms and their susceptibility to guessing by someone
close to the user. These studies are discussed in the
following section.
The second section of the chapter discusses empirical
evaluation of password usage and the composition of those
passwords
.
A. COMPARISON OF PASSWORD MECHANISMS
Beedenbender (1990) conducted research into the recall of
traditional passwords and advanced password schemes. Several
different questionnaires were used with the intent either to
verify information from previous studies or to justify
conclusions about new areas of study.
The respondents answered two versions of the original
questionnaire and a significant other (spouse, close friend or
family member) completed a second form of the questionnaire.
The questionnaire asked for the respondent's sex, years of
computer usage, types of computers with which they were
experienced and a respondents identifier (i.e., Social
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Security Number (SSNjj. The SSN was used to tie all the
questionnaires together with the correct respondent.
(Beedenbender , 1990)
The second part of the questionnaire asked the respondents
to create a password of up to eight alphanumeric characters.
The test group was asked to memorize and safe guard this
password. They were then asked how they devised this
password. The second part of the questionnaire contained a
unique, eight character, system-generated password. Fifty-
five of the questionnaires had a system-generated random
alphanumeric password while the other forty eight
questionnaires had a system-generated pronounceable password.
The second part of the questionnaire asked the respondents
to create a passphrase consisting of any combination of up to
80 alphanumeric characters. There was no minimum requirement
for the passphrase. The respondents were urged to memorize
and safeguard this passphrase like any other password. They
were then asked how they derived this passphrase.
The questionnaires were identical in their third part. In
this section, 20 open response questions ask for items of
information that were described as cognitive passwords. The
first group consisted of six personal facts assumed known
only to the respondent or someone socially close to the
respondent. The second group asked 14 opinion-based questions
(i.e., favorite fruit, favorite food, etc.).
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The final part of the questionnaire requested the
respondent to come up with a list of 20 word associations.
The respondents were not required to use a central theme
throughout nor was there any limitation or minimum number of
alphanumeric characters in either the cues or responses. The
respondents were then asked to copy just the cues onto another
questionnaire to see if a socially close person would be able
to figure out the responses. (Beedenbender , 1990)
Three months after the initial questionnaires were
completed, the respondents were asked to recall the password
they selected, the system-generated password, and the
passphrase they supplied. They were also asked the method of
recal 1 used
.
In the identical version of the cognitive password
section, the same respondents were asked the same questions
again
.
In the identical version of the word association section
the respondents were asked to regenerate their list of 20 cues
and responses . As soon as the respondents had generated as
many associations from memory as possible, they were given a
list of their initial 20 cues. They were then asked to
generate as many responses as they remembered. If, at his
point, they were still unable to remember their responses,
they were given the central theme, if any, to aid them
correctly remembering their responses.
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The final section of the questionnaire requested the
respondents to rank the various password methods by ease of
memory. The respondents were then asked to rank the methods
by how they liked them.
Another questionnaire was then given to the significant-
other. The first part of the questionnaire asked for the
respondents SSN and the relationship of the significant-other
to the respondent. The second part of the questionnaire
repeated the 20 cognitive password questions. The
significant-other was asked to indicate what they thought the
respondents would answer to each of the questions. They were
asked to complete the form without help from the respondents.
The final part of the significant-others questionnaire
asked them to determine the responses to the cues written down
by the respondents from the word association portion of the
initial questionnaire. After attempting to figure out the
correct responses without aid from the respondent, the
significant-other respondent was given a second chance. This
time the respondent would inform the significant-other if
there was a central theme to the association and if so, what
it was
.
In both the cognitive password and word association
sections it was assumed that if someone socially close to the
respondent was unable to figure out the correct responses,
then the chances of an intruder figuring out the responses
would be slim.
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Over the three month period only 21.2% of the respondents
could recall the password that they had created themselves.
As in previous research studies, this research showed that as
password length increased it became more difficult to
remember. ( Beedenbender , 1990)
Similarly only 12.7% of the respondents could recall their
system-generated alphanumeric password. However, the
respondents assigned a system-generated pronounceable
password, 37.5% were able to recall it. It should be pointed
out that not one respondent was able to remember the random
alphanumeric password on his own. Among those who did recall
it, 85.7%, had written it down.
Only 21.4% of the respondents were able to remember their
passphrases. Most of the respondents, 77.7%, choose
passphrases consisting of fewer than the minimum recommended
thirty characters (Porter, 1982). This did not help them in
recalling their passphrase.
After the three month period, the respondents recalled an
average of 74% of their cognitive passwords. Two respondents
were able to recall all 20. The recall average of the fact-
based cognitive passwords was 83%. The opinion-based
cognitive password recall was some what less, only 74.8%. The
people socially close to the respondents could guess no more
than an average of 38% of the respondents' cognitive
passwords. Only a few significant-others could legitimately
guess more than 10 out of 20 responses. Two significant-
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others could not guess any of the 20 responses correctly.
(Beedenbender, 1990)
The guessing of fact-based cognitive passwords showed the
significant-other able to correctly respond to 44.3% cf the
questions while averaging only 32.5% for the opinion-based
cognitive passwords.
The notion that people more socially close to the
respondents are better guessers than those even slightly
removed, was found to be true. The average number of correct
guesses for family members was 60%, while spouses were 41% and
friends were 23.5%. ( Eeedenbender , 1990)
On average, the respondents recalled 69% cf their word
association. Seven respondents recalled ali 20 responses and
almost a third remembered 90% or more of their responses.
While there was success at the high end cf the spectrum,
there was a fairly uniform distribution of respondents
remembering from 30%-90%. This distribution may be explained
by the fact that respondents were given a free reign in making
up their word association. Unlike the cognitive password
section, in which all the respondents answered the same
questions, the word associations had various degrees of
difficulty depending upon how challenging each respondent
decided to make them. (Beedenbender, 1990)
Even with the wide variance, the average success rate was
over twice that of the user-generated password method. In
comparison with the overall success rate of cognitive
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passwords, word associations were not as great (69% to 74%).
However, there were twice as many respondents scoring 90% or
more correct responses on the word associations than on the
cognitive passwords.
The significant-others, on average, could guess only 25.5%
of the correct responses. Seventeen significant-others could
not guess even one response correctly. A small percentage of
significant-others (10.3%) were able to guess ten or more
responses correctly. When significant-others knew the central
theme the success rate improved to 33%. There were still six
significant-others who could not guess any correct responses.
Even with the theme, the significant-others failed to
guess as many correct responses (33% to 38%) as they had in
the cognitive passwords section. Also, unlike cognitive
passwords, social closeness made no significant difference in
the ability of the significant-other to figure out the
responses. (Beedenbender , 1990)
When ranking the various methods as to how easy they were
to remember, the respondents clearly chose user-generated
passwords as the one that they thought was easiest. However,
this method was one of the worst for recall by the
respondents. Other than this, the rankings generally
reflected how the respondents actually did in recalling their
passwords from the different methods. (Beedenbender, 1990)
In another study, Zviran and Haga (1990) conducted tests
of the memorability of cognitive passwords and their
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susceptibility to guessing by people close to the users. At
the same time they tested the recall of system-generated
passwords (random alphanumeric seven-character strings; and
user-generated passwords.
The study included the use of three similar versions of a
self-administered questionnaire. The primary respondents in
the study, called user-respondents, answered a first
questionnaire to determine their age, sex, years of computer
usage, the types of computer which they have used (mainframe,
stand-alone micro or micro linked to mainframe) and the last
four digits of their Social Security Number (SSN) . The SSNs
were used to hide the identity of the respondents while
allowing for a method of linking future questionnaires
together
.
The second part of the questionnaire asked the user-
respondents to create a password of up to eight alphanumeric
characters. They were urged to memorize and safeguard it like
any other password. They were then asked how they devised it.
Finally, in this part of the questionnaire they were assigned
a system-generated unique seven-character password. These
passwords were constructed of random combinations of letters
and numbers. The respondents were asked to memorize and
safeguard this password as well.
The third section of the questionnaire asked for twenty
open-response, cognitive items. This information fell into
two groups. In the first group were six items that asked for
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personal facts that assume only a respondent or someone
socially close to a respondent would know. For example:
elementary school attended, first name of favorite uncle,
first name of best friend in high school, mother's maiden
name, first name of first boyfriend/girlfriend or father's
occupation. In the second group were 14 opinion-based items
that asked each respondent to declare favorites. For example:
favorite music, favorite color, favorite flower, favorite
vegetable and favorite dessert. Again it is assumed that only
someone close to the respondent would know the responses.
(Zviran and Haga, 1990b)
The first questionnaires were completed and three months
later the respondents were given a second questionnaire. This
questionnaire repeated the same 20 question from the previous
form. It also asked the respondents to recall the password
they created and the system-generated password they were
assigned. They were then asked if they had recalled the
passwords from memory or had resorted to writing them down.
The significant-other version of the questionnaire asked
for only two items of identifying data: the last four digits
of the user-respondent's SSN and the relationship of the
significant-other to the respondent. The remainder of the
questionnaire repeated the 20 cognitive question from the
first two forms. Each significant-other respondent was asked
to complete the questionnaire without help from their user-
respondent friends or spouses. They were asked to guess what
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he/she thought his or her user-respondent would answer to each
question. They were also asked to answer only questions that
they were confident of their responses, leaving blank those
items where they would have to guess widely. This was done in
order to see how well the significant-others could guess the
responses of the user-respondents. Assuming that if people
who were socially close to the users showed deficient
knowledge of personal data, then someone who was socially
distant from the same user would be unlikely to guess
cognitive passwords. (Zviran and Haga , 1990b)
The results showed that after the three month interval
,
respondents were better able to recall conventional passwords
that they created than they were at recalling passwords that
were assigned to them. A minority of the respondents wrote
down the self-created passwords while most of them wrote down
the passwords assigned in order to aid in remembering the
passwords
.
The average number of correct recalls by the user-
respondents on all cognitive data questions was 82 percent.
That equates to 15 to 17 correct responses. Compare the level
of these responses with responses for the two type of
conventional passwords recalled over the same period and the
best response was 35 percent for self-generated passwords. On
the cognitive data continuum, that equates to only 7 correct
matches. No respondent scored that low on cognitive data.
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The significant-other questionnaire showed an accuracy of
only 27 percent correct responses of all cognitive items. The
correct responses were skewed towards the low end of the
scale. Only one person was able to guess 10 out of 20
cognitive questions correctly. Moreover, a comparison of the
profile of this distribution with that of the user-respondents
showed no overlap between user-respondent responses and
significant-other responses.
The significant-others were able to guess only 37 percent
on average of fact-based items. It is assumed that
significant-others would know fact-based items better than
they would know opinion-based items. That appears to be true
since significant-others guessed only a third of opinion-based
items. Even though they are precisely the people who should
know better than anyone the personal facts about user-
respondents .
Assuming that significant-other are in the best position
to possess personal knowledge about the user-respondent then
the accuracy of personal knowledge will decrease if even the
slightest social distance is introduced. This was proven out
when the number of correct guesses by spouses were compared to
correct guesses by friends. The spouses guessed correctly on
29 percent of the items while the friends guessed correctly on
only 16 percent of the items. (Zviran and Haga , 1990b)
Over the three month period, the study showed that the
recall of cognitive items was noticeably better than the
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recall of either the self-created or assigned passwords.
Cognitive passwords were recalled 82 percent of the time while
self-generated and system-generated passwords were recalled
35% and 23% respectively.
B. EVALUATION OF PASSWORD USE
Several studies have been conducted to assess usage
patterns of traditional passwords.
Morris and Thompson (1979) conducted experiments to
determine typical users' habits in the choice of passwords
when no constraint is put on their choice. The results are
disappointing. In a collection of 3,289 passwords Morris and
Thompson found, 15 were single ASCII character; 72 were
strings of two ASCII characters; 464 were strings of three
ASCII characters; 477 were strings of four alphamerics; 706
were five letters, all upper-case or all lower-case; 650 were
six letters, all lower-case. An additional 492 passwords
appeared in various dictionaries, name lists, and the like.
A total of 2,831 or 86 percent of this sample of passwords
fell into one of these classes.
There was overlap between the dictionary results and the
character string searches. The dictionary search alone, which
required only five minutes to run, produced about one third of
the passwords. (Morris and Thompson, 1979)
In another study conducted in 1987 at Syracuse University
using the university's timesharing system, 6226 user-selected
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passwords used to authenticate 7014 computer user identities
were compared. Researcher found that if left on their own,
people are lazy about passwords, relying on easy to remember
passwords such as initials, pronouns, nouns, or mnemonics, and
unless forced to, people do not change their passwords on a
regular basis. People prefer three to five character
passwords to seven or eight character passwords. Only a small
number of users seek complex passwords using number and
letters in all eight positions. Only 15% of the passwords are
repeated. The majority of passwords are as unique as the
people who created them. About 30% of all the passwords that
are user created use a true English word; an additional 10%
can be assigned a part of speech based on the English word
found in them. If two- or three-character passwords are
excluded, about 44% of the passwords use a true English word




In a study conducted by Zviran and Haga (1990) of 997
self-generated passwords they found that 80.1 percent of the
passwords consisted of alphabetic characters only, 13.7
percent of alphanumeric characters, 5.5 percent of numeric
characters, and 0.7 percent of ASCII characters. The average
number of characters in a password, calculated from the
password lengths in the study, was six. Thirteen percent of
the passwords consisted of eight characters, 14 percent of
seven characters, 25 percent of six characters, 24 percent of
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five characters, 17 percent of four characters, and 5.6
percent of three characters. (Zviran and Haga , 1990)
One survey, conducted recently at a government agency,
found that 43% of the agency's 1,500 employees used two-
character passwords (probably their initials), and over 25%
used a single character. Compliance with good practice is no
better in business. A survey of 50,000 users in several
private companies revealed that about 20% used single
character passwords. (Highland, 1990)
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VI . PASSWORD USE IN PRACTICE
This chapter will expose a reader to the practice of
password usage in commonly used computing environments. The
system access control for three major operating systems on
mainframes/minicomputers will be discussed (i.e., IBM's MVS,
DEC'S VMS/VAX and Unix).
A. MULTI-USER OPERATING SYSTEMS
Security in multi-user operating systems covers three
areas: system access control, file access control, and audit.
System access control is concerned with the identification and
authentication of users when they first establish contact with
the system. This includes both interactive access through
terminals along with access through network protocols and
batch access through jobs. File and database access controls
are concerned with controlling access to both programs and
data files by authorized users. Detection of unauthorized
access attempts and verification of authorized access is
controlled by the audit function. (Courtney, 1991)
1. IBM's VMS
IBM's MVS operating system for the System/370
mainframes was a successor of the System/360 operating system,
and was principally designed to support commercial batch
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processing in a closed environment. Although the first
version in 1976 already contained the time-sharing option
(TSO) software, this interactive user interface was still
dedicated to preparing batch jobs, submitting them and
inspecting the results of their execution. In fact, TSO was
subordinate to batch in those days. Owing to the "closed
shop" characteristics and the emphasis on batch production,
access control was not one of the major topics during the
design of those early non-RACF (resource access control
facility) systems. ( Paans , 1991)
The security mechanisms initially integrated in
System/370 and MVS were as follows:
• Both the hardware and operating system allowed a
distinction to be made between authorized system software
and unauthorized user programs (supervisor vs. problem-
program mode, key in storage, virtual vs. real storage,
address spaces, etc.).
When logging on to TSO the user had to provide a user ID
and a password. Both were stored in clear text in the
system library SYS1.UADS.
• The system data set PASSWORD could contain read and/or
write passwords for data sets.
• For data sets controlled by the virtual storage access
method (VSAM) it was possible to define passwords which
were stored in the catalogues.
- An expiration date for a data set could be defined.
(Paans, 1991)
Although there are security mechanisms allowing at
least some control over users, many computing centers do not
really use them because of lack of interest in security, or
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used them in such a way that they are rendered ineffective.
(Paans and Bonnes, 1983)
Initially MVS contained an interface for a security
package, which was later filled in by RACF . The first versions
of RACF were designed to allow a gradual move from an
unprotected environment to a protected environment, and only
controlled those subjects (persons, users) and objects
(resources, d :^.ta sets) explicitly defined. For each subject
and each obj t one had to create an RACF profile describing
the authorities of the subjects, the access requirements for
the objects, the relations, etc. In those days security was
sometimes characterized as "nothing is protected unless
explicitly specified", especially because many centers did not
bring all users under RACF control. They were usually
satisfied when the most important users and resources were
protected, and allowed the remaining users to work as non-RACF
users and to access unprotected data sets. (Paans, 1991)
While the password was first in clear text in the
system library SYS1.UADS, with RACF it was moved to the RACF
database and was scrambled via a masking algorithm. Although
this provided more security, the password still remained in
clear text in the terminal status block (TSB) in virtual
storage legible to many users, and, moreover, the masking
algorithm was easy to compromise. Hence the design of TSO was
improved to remove the clear text password from the TSB, and
RACF was extended with data encryption standard (DES) for
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passwords. This was RACF 1.6 in 1984, introduced a one-way
encryption via DES and so storing encrypted passwords which
could not be decrypted (Mclellan, 1986; Paans , 1991).
Moreover the system administrator was now allowed to
specity rules for password syntax and usage. He now may issue
the following parameters:
• A list of previous passwords is maintained and the user is
not allowed to select one of them when specifying a new
password
.
After a specified number of days a password is marked
expired and has to be changed by the user during his or
her next log-on.
• If a user forgets his password and attempts to guess it,
RACF will revoke (freeze) his userid after he exceeds the
specified threshold.
• Up to eight syntax rules can be specified for new
passwords. For each position, one may indicate whether
alphabetic, alphanumeric, numeric, vowel, non-vowel and
constant character are allowed. (Paans, 1991)
RACF at the level 1.6 and higher provides sufficient
support to force the users to use passwords in a responsible
and secure way. Keeping in mind that a trivial password such
as a user ID or the user's Christian name can only be selected
once, and thereafter has to be followed by at least twenty
three other passwords. Moreover, forcing the user to insert
at least one numeric in the password inhibits the use of names
of persons and brands of cars. And, after all, the hacker has
only three to five chances to guess the correct combination of
userid and password. Elementary statistics show that the
probability of a hit is negligible in such an environment as
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long as there are reliable procedures for initial passwords
and password resets. With modern RACF and a security minded
attitude by those in charge of the system, hackers have no
realistic chance to breach the security. (Paans, 1991)
2. DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP . ' s VAX/VMS
When DEC released its initial version of VMS in 1978,
it protected the password file with an encryption algorithm
called AUTODIN 2 CRC . That algorithm performed a hash on the
password and then stored the 32-bit hash rather than the
password itself. (Mclellan, 1986)
It became, however, a tempting target for
cryptanalysts and by 1980, two different methods had been
discovered to invert the algorithm and decode the password.
DEC realized that it should not have encrypted the
password alone, and that 32-bit hash was too short to avoid
'aliases" (identical encrypted passwords for different users) .
It also realized that the AUTODIN 2 CRC encryption algorithm,
which executed in 140 microseconds, was too fast, allowing
brute-force decryption schemes to work.
After three years of using AUTODIN 2, DEC shifted
(with VMS version 2) to the so-called Purdy algorithm for
encrypting its password authorization file in its VMS version
2. DEC also changed the encryption procedure to use a 64-bit
hash of the password, plus user's name, plus 16-bit random
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"salt" that was also stored in the user's User Authorization
File (UAF) record. (Mclellan, 1986)
The mix of these three elements, plus the addition of
a random salt, meant that any brute-force attack had to target
each user's password individual ly--rather than try a
particular password guess across the entire authorization
file. In addition to making the encrypted password user-
specific, DEC had—with the Purdy algorithm— shifted to a
crypto system that was almost 100 times slower than the
AUTODIN 2 CRC. (Mclellan, 1986)
The Purdy algorithm in a VAX has no "key." It is
simply an inherently irreversible mathematical scheme based on
the difficulty of factoring large numbers—the same class of
problems at the heart of the widely publicized RSA "public
key" crypto system.
DEC exhibited considerable independence in choosing
the Purdy algorithm over government-approved forms of
cryptography
—
specifically the Data Encryption Standard (DES)
algorithm promoted since 1975 by the National Security Agency
(NSA) and the National Bureau of Standards (NBS).
By avoiding DES, DEC successfully stepped out of the
class of code users who were overly dependent on government
approval. By doing so, DEC escaped the impact of the NSA's
announcement in 1985 that DES was now so old and too widely
used to be trusted any longer. Also, in relying on a cipher
that used prime-number factoring as its coding principle, DEC
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chose a scheme that is actually mathematically similar to the
crypto devices the NSA is now promoting for new, "stronger-
than-DES" crypto security. (Mclellan, 1986)
DEC'S VMS has achieved a National Security Agency
(NSA) rating of C2 which provides the capability of defining
who can and cannot use the system, what they can access, and
why. It also provides a strong audit capability to ensure
control is maintained while retaining the flexibility needed
in a general purpose operating system. (Candia, 1990)
DEC'S latest release, VMS version 5.4 includes
additional password controls. For security managers worried
about sophisticated users bypassing minimum password length
requirements, the algorithm has been changed. For sites with
local requirements for password hash algorithms, there is now
a means of specifying one's own algorithm. (Kilgallen, 1991)
For most sites, however, the password history and
password screening features are the most significant
improvements. By default, VMS will retain a history of hashed
values of users passwords, and prohibit the user from choosing
a new password which has been used in the past. There is
limited amount of space (adjustable by the system manager) for
storage of old passwords. By default, this will hold several
years worth of passwords, even if they are changed as often as
once per month. For the malevolent user who decides to change
his or her password many times to overflow the space, there is
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no safety. In that event, VMS forces that particular user to
use a machine-generated password. (Kilgallen, 1991)
Password screening prevents users from choosing new
passwords which are found in an on-line dictionary of North
American English words. In addition to dictionary screening,
VMS V5 . 4 also supports site-specific exits during password
selection, so that local tests can be made as to the
suitability of passwords. This could be used to enforce a
requirement that all passwords include both letters and
numbers, or that no password start with the letter A, or any
other restriction.
It is imperative that security managers ensure that
the new security features on VMS V5.4 are actually being used.
At many sites system managers have decided to exempt some or
all users from the new password requirements. Viewed from the
security perspective, that is ridiculous; but it still
happens
.
Of course, system managers have the ability to
override these password restrictions and assign trivial
passwords to themselves or to certain favored individuals.
The fact that password restrictions are normally in place does
not eliminate the need to periodically run password-guessing
tests against each machine. (Kilgallen, 1991)
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3. UNIX
Unix systems make use of a modified version of the DES
algorithm. As with IBM systems, Unix systems put a password
into the DES key port in order to make it a one-way encryption
system. But as with DEC with the Purdy algorithm, Unix avoids
both government crypto controls and the inherent risk of being
part of a large group that is using a standard crypto
algorithm—inevitably a choice target for hostile
cryptanalysts . (Mclellan, 1966)
The features that make Unix machines easy tc use can
also make them vulnerable to attack. Hence, Unix has acquired
a reputation for weak security (Lonsford, 1990).
The parameters and practices for user IDs and
passwords set up by the IS staff are the most important
criteria for securely running any computer system. These
controls are even more critical under Unix.
In Unix, a user creates an ID, also referred to as an
open ID or open account, that requires no log-in password.
Users of open-IDs must be assigned to single-user workstations
that have no outside connections. Thus, an open-ID would be
unacceptable for a multi-user system or a network. ( Lonsford,
1990)
Two features that can create problems similar to the
open user ID are the "trusted host" and "trusted user." From
the trusted host, all remote log-ins are accepted without a
password. A trusted user is a single user who is allowed to
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log-in from his or her local system to another without
supplying a password. A list of the system's trusted hosts is
located in the file /etc/hosts . equiv.
In the home directory of every trusted user is a file,
calied .rhosts, which lists the systems from which the user
can log in without a password. Often the user configures each
account so that he or she may log in from the other hosts
without a password. Attackers have exploited this by gaining
access to the user's account on one system, then attempting to
log-in to the systems named in the .rhosts file. (Lonsford,
1990 )
Most operating systems, such as IBM's MVS or DEC'S
VAX/VMS with resource access control facility (RACFj, have
split up the various access privileges and allotted them to
categories. For example, in order to make backups, the
operator must have the ability to read any dataset on the
system. That privilege might be called READALL . The security
administrator, who sets up the system rules and file
protections, would have a privilege on his personal account
called security. Unix, however, has no such distinctions;
it's all or nothing when it comes to system privileges.
Unix has only one privileged ID or account, which has
ail privileges. It is common practice at Unix sites to share
this superuser ID, called root, among the system
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administrators simply by sharing the password. Of course,
sharing an ID and password creates an accountability problem.
(Lonsford, 1990)
As a remedy, many Unix systems require the privileged
user to log into a personal account first, the use the setuser
command to log in again as root. Thus, the privileged user
must know two passwords to become root. A byproduct of the
setuser command is an audit record that tracks who logged in
as root.
Obviously, these procedures are only good if the users
who are allowed to sign on as root are trustworthy. A user
who can bypass or override such security controls has the keys
to the entire system. Any user who is signed on as root, the
highest level of Unix privilege, can delete the log records on
all but the most secure systems, This is true, not only of
Unix, but VMS, MVS and other operating systems.
Once the IS staff have secured user-IDs, they snould
turn to passwords. Most operating systems provide a way to
set requirements for passwords. (Lonsford, 1990)
Unix, however, has no built-in password-screening
facility. Nor does it have a place to add one eas i 1 y— 1 eaving
users to there own choices. Without guidance from IS most
users will pick an easy password and stick with it.
Fortunately, some new versions of Unix and commercial add-on
packages, provide password generators that can improve basic
Unix ID and password administration.
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Another vulnerability in Unix's password
administration is that the file containing user-IDs and
passwords, called /etc/passwd, is publicly readable. Although
the passwords in the file are encrypted, the encryption
routine is readily accessible. Encrypting a guess at a
password and comparing it with those in the password file is
a simpie matter. Newer versions of Unix, such as
Microsystems Inc.'s SunOS version 4.0, and AT&T's System V
release 2.2 and System V/MLS, have addressed the problem by
moving the passwords from /etc/passwd into a shadow file that
is readable only by root. (Lonsford, 1990)
Deciding which files en the system are critical is key
to determining how to structure Unix's file transfer
mechanisms and remote access features. These files should, of
course, include the operating system and configuration files,
password file and any shared program files, including both
source and executable program files.
Unix provides several features to control and monitor
remote access. Unix can, for instance, limit remote commands
to prevent remote system users from controlling the central
system. The exact controlling mechanism depends on the flavor
of Unix in use. Some Unix systems restrict the use of
commands by specific remote nodes; some have restrictions that
include all remote nodes. Regardless of the mechanism, the IS
staff should decide which commands and directories shouid be
accessible to remote users or disallow all remote commands.
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The administrator should also be sure he/she has enabled the
Unix feature that automatically generates audit trails of
remotely initiated activities, and it should be reviewed
regularly. [Lonsford, 1990)
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VII. ALTERNATIVE AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS
This chapter discusses alternative security techniques to
traditional and advanced password schemes. Such alternatives
include hardware features, tokens, smart cards, and biometric
devices (See Fig. 3;. Several of these methods are used in
























Figure 3. Alternative Authentication Mechanisms
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A. HARDWARE FEATURES
1. Automatic Call -back
One early solution to the end-user authentication
problem in a network environment was the call-back device
(Murray, 1983; Wilson, 1987).
With an automatic call-back system, an authorized user
dials a computer system. After a user identifies himself to
the system, the computer breaks the communication line by
hanging up on the user. It then compares the user and
telephone number to an internal list and calls the user back
at a predetermined number.
All dial-back accomplishes is to change the telephone
number the hacker must attack. The effectiveness of the call-
back system is based on the assumption that it is calling back
an end-point of the network. The problem arises when a PC
user has left his PC hooked up to his desk telephone in order
to conduct business from another remote location. To break
in, all a hacker may need to do is call up that user's office
telephone and do a logical execution of the PC function keys
until finding the one which automatically dials up a
departmental minicomputer. If a user has programmed all
his/her host sign-on codes into the PC, the hacker performs
another logical execution of the function keys, causing the
minicomputer to automatically dial into the host. And the
host, after recognizing the call on one of its call-back
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lines, hangs up and calls the remotely controlled minicomputer
back (Murray, 1983; Wilson 1987).
In a closed network system where the end-points and
telecommunications paths of the network are known, an
automatic call-back system can be a useful security device.
But in today's open network system the automatic call-back
system as a means of security is limited. (Wilson, 1987)
2. Authentication Servers
Working in a network environment poses additional
threats to security since penetrating a machine may enable a
penetrator to compromise other network-connected computers as
well. Authentication servers are one way of authorizing users
to all machines on a network. An example of such a mechanism
is Kerberos , an authentication mechanism for untrusted
workstations developed at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology for their Project Athena network of workstations.
(Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989)
The Kerberos system is a "trusted third-party
authent icator " meaning the network clients using the system
trust the server's "judgement as to the identity of each of
its other network clients to be accurate." The authenticator
server maintains a database of its network clients and their
private keys. Using these private keys along with session
keys generated by the server, tickets identifying network
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clients are created and used as evidence of authentication.
Kerberos can be used to authenticate all network services.
When a user identifies himself as a Kerberos client by
entering a user name, the user name is sent to the
authentication server, along with a request for ticket-
granting service. The authentication server first checks to
see if it knows about the network client. If so, the
authentication server generates a random session key to be
used during communications between the network client and the
ticket-granting server. The authentication server then
forwards information on the network client to the ticket-
granting server, encrypted with a key known only to the
authentication and ticket-granting servers. A copy of this
ticket is then sent to the network client, encrypted in the
network client's private key which was derived from the user's
password, known only by the network client and the
authentication server. The network client then asks the user
for the password. The entered password is then used to
decrypt the response from the authentication server. The
ticket contained in the response is then the information that
the network client needs in order to request network services.
While the Kerberos method is complicated, it achieves
the primary goal of authenticating untrusted workstations and
their users. (Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989)
More sophisticated measures than passwords and
hardware features are needed to control the security problems
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in this new, open network environment. The solution for the
commercial environment is a sign-on security mechanism,
independent of network configuration, that unequivocally
identities the specific authorized user seeking system access.
This enhanced security can be accomplished using dynamic
password devices and one-time password devices. These devices
are discussed in tne following section.
B. TOKENS AND SMART CARDS
The major challenges to increasing security in information
systems have been cost and convenience (Weiss, 1990). What is
needed is to provide a ccst-ef f ective increase in the level of
security without burdening the user or the security
administrator; system users need to maintain the convenience,
portability, and flexibility of a simple password; and must
exponentially increase system security at the same time. An
effective way to accomplish these goals is to supplement the
traditional password with an authentication mechanism (e.g.
tokens) (Weiss, 1990).
An example of a token as an authentication mechanism is a
bank ATM card. It requires a user to insert the card into a
"card reader" at the ATM terminal --which reads data stored on
the card's "magnetic tape" and then demands a second
identifier: the user's memorized PIN to verify access. The
ATM card along with the PIN ensures that the user is
authenticated properly. (Weiss, 1990)
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Any strategy to develop a creative solution should
emphasize three overriding criteria: greatly increased
security, end user convenience, and flexibility. This
criteria led to the following goals:
• Any new scneme must be at least several orders of
magnitude more secure than existing technologies.
• The convenience, portability, and ease of use associated
with passwords should be maintained.
• No additional equipment should be required at the physical
terminal
.
• If a token were used, it should be as convenient to carry
as credit card, (hopefully very similar in size).
• A token should strongly resist counterfeiting.
• The computer access token should support added value by:
being adaptable as an ID badge; provide over-the-phone
authent ication ; allow for additional uses such as physical
access control and encryption key generation. (Weiss,
1990 )
One solution is to design a credit card-size device which
can electronically "display" a code unique to an individual.
If such a card could change its display every 30 or 60
seconds—and a synchronized host computer was programmed to
accept that card's displayed code only while it was being
displayed, and then but once—then the risk of electronic
eavesdropping or casual observation evaporates. (Weiss, 1990)
About 20 vendors currently market such hand held devices,
each of which contains a microprocessor, battery and LCD
readout and ranges in price from $30 to $100 per unit. Four
vendors' product, however, lead the market: Enigma Logic's
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Multisync and Access Card; Racal -Guardata ' s Watchword
Generator; Digital Pathways' Securnet Key; and Security
Dynamics' SecurlD. Token software, which can reside on a
mainframe, minicomputer or personal computer, is customized
for each installation and thus ranges in cost. (Highland,
1990;
Enigma Logic's Multisync and Access Card, Raca 1 -Guardata '
s
Watchword Generator, and Digital Pathways' Securnet Key
produce devices that are about the size of a small calculator
with a numeric keypad and use a "challenge-response" strategy.
The user logs on to his/her terminal using a PIN and the
computer response with a " chal lenge"--a single digit or series
of digits on the terminal screen--which the user keys into the
token. The handheld device then performs a computation on the
challenge based on an algorithm assigned specifically to that
token. When the token displays the results, or "response,"
the user enters it into the terminal's keyboard. Meanwhile,
the host has performed the same computation. If both
responses match, the user's identity is verified. (Highland,
1990)
Security Dynamics' device is the size of a credit card and
operates on a random-number basis. When the system is set up,
a starting number, or "seed," is assigned to the token and
recorded on the host. To access the host, the user first
enters his/her PIN and then the random number generated by the
device, which changes every 60 seconds. The host verifies the
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authenticity of the PIN and then refers to its reference taJble
to find the seed as well as the date and time that the seed
was put into the token. Using an algorithm, the computer
determines what number the token should have displayed and
compares it with the number entered. (Highland, 1990)
Even if a device is lost or stolen, other built-in
features inhibit illegal access. The software for each token
allows only a certain number of log-on attempts before locking
out a user
.
Some token software also includes an audit trail and
built-in alarm that alerts the security administrator or host
operator of illegal access attempts. Some software can be
customized to provide data on files accessed as well as
exception reports.
While tokens have been available for more than a decade,
early releases were somewhat unreliable. Battery failures and
other malfunctions wreaked havoc on systems. While recent
improvements have made these devices more acceptable for
general use, these devices pose some drawbacks.
One problem is the tiny keyboards on the challenge-
response devices. For any one with medium-size fingers, it is
very difficult to push in a number on the half-centimeter-
square numbers without hitting the key next to it, about 4mm
away. Many people resort to using an implement such as a
pencil eraser.
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The problem is not just reduced accuracy. On the
challenge-response type of token, a user has only a limited
amount of time to key in the challenge to the device and
response tc the host. If the user exceeds the time limit,
he/she is automatically logged off. If the user misses three
times, the system locks him/her out. (Highland, 1990)
While some token software can be adjusted to lengthen the
response limit, too lengthy a duration will compromise
security. Limiting time is another good method of screening
an intruder wno is inexperienced with the token.
Battery life is another concern. A typical battery will
last five years, but the security administrator should always
keep a log to anticipate replacements. On units with embedded
batteries, the entire token must be replaces.
The more severe problem posed by faulty or worn-out
batteries is that the user cannot access the system. In other
cases, a user might forget or misplace the token, or it might
be stolen. In the last case, the security administrator needs
to deactivate the user's account.
Because it is inevitable that an employee will at some
point leave a token in another pocket or purse, the security
administrator must keep spare tokens available.
As with passwords, the use of tokens can overlook the fact
that most computer-related crimes or errors are committed by
authorized users. Software may someday be available to
support tokens, adding a third layer to the access control
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system. They could protect highly classified files by
challenging any user attempting access. If tokens are
assigned only to users who should see these files, tokens
could be used tc screen unauthorized access. (Highland, 1990).
1. Fixed Password Devices
A "dumb' token, such as a credit card carries a fixed
password. This is communicated whenever the token is read.
If the host system reads the token directly (electrically),
the data can be hidden from the user. The user can not
memorize it create copies or communicate it to others. Thus
one principal consequence of using an authentication device is
that users need not be trusted with the authenticating data.
The key, of which there is one copy, remains in the user's
hand, where its presence can be observed, rather than in the
head, where it cannot be checked. (Spender, 1987)
This is only true if the device is secure from
interrogation by anything other than its host system. There
must be no other way of reading the data from the token or
otherwise copying it. The host can add further security by
updating the data every time the device is used and creating
cross-checked audit trials in both device and host. In
general, devices can be made more secure if they have
additional "smarts" such as read/write memory or a
microprocessor. Then the token can demand identifying data
from a user and/or the host before operating correctly.
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A direct reading token needs a reader, such as a
magnetic stripe reader, at the user's terminal. An
alternative is to equip the device with its own reader, i.e.
engineer it as a cal culator- 1 ike password generating device.
When questioned by the host, a user inputs that question into
tne token, which generates an answer which is then passed back
to the host. Though if the question is always the same, a
user will be able to record the answering password and use it
without having the token. (Spender, 1987)
2. Dynamic Password Devices
In the past several years, a major development in the
computer security field has been dynamic password security
systems. Computer users seeking to verify their authorized
identities through dynamic password systems do not know the
value of the password by which they gain entry. They may have
memorized a portion of a required password but the remainder
can only be obtained from a hardware password issuing device,
which displays a different password each time it is used
(Bosen, 1986; Avarne , 1988).
Some of these devices derive their dynamic passwords
by encrypting combinations of the current date and/or time (or
elapsed time between two successive usages). Others encrypt
their own prior usage history. Most are capable of encrypting
random-number challenges issued by security logic within the
protected computer resources. Some encrypt random flashes of
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light emanating from the surface of a CRT driven by
appropriate security software. (Bosen, 1986)
If the token has an on-board microprocessor it will be
able to process data. The microprocessor can be used to hide
the authenticating data. One widely adopted method is to use
the authenticating data as an encryption formula or cryptokey.
A user can be presented with an unexpected text, such as a
random number. This is entered on the token's calculator- 1 ike
keyboard and the encrypted text read off its display. The
encrypted reply to the host's random challenge is passed back
to the host: which then determines the cryptokey used. In
this way the hosts knows the token's identity and, by
implication, which user is accessing the system. The host's
task is simplified if it knows all registered cryptokeys and
simply establishes which of these, if any, has been used.
Provided the token's encryption technology is sound,
this lock and key interaction keeps the authenticating data
secret. It is only revealed to the host in the complex
cryptographic relationship between the challenge and the
response. Randomizing the challenge prevents a user, or
anyone else, from responding correctly without actually using
the correct token. (Bosen, 1986)
There are alternatives to the challenge/response
approach. Any piece of changing data shared by both the token
and the host, such as the clock time of the user/host
interaction, can be encrypted. This type of token needs a
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clock synchronized with the host's. The advantage of
synchronized token is that the challenge data does not need to
be entered, it is already known to the token. Since the user
dees not need to enter the challenge, this approach may seem
more user-friendly.
The two mode, full challenge/response and
synchronized, create different implementation problems, system
risks and user benefits. Some of the commercially available
tokens offer both modes, others only one. (Spender, 1987)
Dynamic passwords are entirely unpredictable and so
cannot be guessed. They are only used once, so are of no use
to an attacker, if they are intercepted. (.Avarne, 1988)
Several disadvantages are associated with dynamic
passwords. First, if the token is lost or stolen it could be
used by an intruder to access the system. Secondly, the
expense of outfitting each employee with a token may be cost
prohibitive (Bosen, 1986; Avarne , 1988).
3 . One-Time Passwords
Another variation of dynamic passwords are one-time
passwords. One-time passwords use a credit card-sized device
which can electronically "display" a code unique to an
individual. The card is designed to change its display every
30 or 60 seconds—and a synchronized host computer is
programmed to accept that card's displayed code only while it
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is being displayed, and then only once—this eliminates the
risk of electronic eavesdropping or casual observation.
(Weiss, 1990)
The use of this card requires what appears to be two
passwords: one classic and conventional, the PIN; the other is
the displayed card-code.
They are, of course, different. They share only
convenience, portability, and ease of use. The second ID
validator, the changing and unpredictable 4 to 8-character
card-code displayed on the card's LCD screen, becomes concrete
evidence ^without a card reader) that the card (token) is at
that point and time available to the user. It is a coded
representation of the possession of an uncounterf eitabl
e
token. A user's eyes are the card reader, the existing
terminal keyboard is the ID entry device, the code entered is
a password that is not a tradition password. (Weiss, 1990)
One of the strengths of this password scheme i3 that
the codes generated and displayed by the card can't be known
ahead of time, memorized, loaned, or even guessed by anyone.
There is no pattern; prior codes become irrelevant.
A user simply reads the displayed alphanumeric
characters off of the card, types them in—and now, any PC or
dumb terminal captures two ID authenticators (Weiss, 1990).
The one-time password produced by the tiny computer
within the ID card— can replace the memorized password in
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identifying the user to an Information System. It can also be
added as a second authent icator to supplement the first. For
example, the system at the host demands, first, an assigned,
secret and memorized password, and only second, the card-code
which, at that moment, is being displayed on the ID card's LCD
screen. Together they form a pass-code. (Weiss, 1990)
The use of this second independent token-based
identifier vastly increases the certainty cf end-user
authentication. Security managers no longer need to worry so
about one co-worker learning another's password, the headache
of password administration is greatly reduced. Outsider and
hacker-related threats virtually disappear; and internal
threats--a 1 ways mere prevalent and serious are controlled
because audit trails offer solid accountability.
The pass-code requires two independent elements--
something known--the memorized password; and something
possessed--the ID card and its displayed card code. A lost
card becomes useless without its complementing password.
Similarly, the memorized password is worthless without the
uncounterf eitabl e card token to generate the one-time card
code. (Weiss, 1990)
The proliferation of networks has created great and
valid concern about the security of passwords transmitted in
clear-text. A new technology is available which protests the
secrecy and integrity of your passwords without the expense
and complications of full network encryption.
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The great strength of the one-time password generated
by a hand held ID card lies in its computational
unpredictability. The displayed card code is, in part, the
result of a mathematical process known as a one-way function
with data loss). There is no known way to reverse the
calculation, or predict or compute a fraudulent card code,
even with the card in hand for study. Absolutely nothing
transmitted over the network will ever allow an intruder to
later-or sequent ial 1 y-gain illicit access to a protected
system
.
To give full protection to the memorized password, the
first of the two independent ID authenticators suggested,
Security Dynamics has developed a SecurlD "P Card" (pin pad).
Still the size of a credit card, the P card has pressure-
sensitive keys built into it. A user enters his memorized PIN
into the card, and the displayed sum of the two separate
authentication codes can then be transmitted over an open line
with full assurance that an eavesdropper gains absolutely
nothing if the resulting PASSCODE is intercepted. (Weiss,
1990)
A constant added to a random number produces only a
random sum. No clear-text password is ever transmitted; nor
is the user's memorized password ever stored within the card.
The card does not compare or validate the entered PIN; it
simply adds it to the next random number generated by the
card. (Weiss, 1990)
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4. Relating Tokens and Users
The ergonomic issues are important because identity is
associated with the token, not the user to whom it has been
issued. Most corporate employees are getting used to carrying
credit-card style photo-ID badges. These may double as
physical access control devices and control the users'
movement about a secure plant, operating with direct readers;
magnetic stripe, bar code, tuned eddy-current proximity
devices and smart cards. Such established behavior patterns
make a credit-card type token especially attractive.
A token can be lent, 3tolen or otherwise fall into
another's hand. If it alone establishes identity, that
identity is readily transferred, as a car key transfers the
driver's identity as far as the car is concerned. One widely
adopted method of tying the token logically to its legitimate
user is to have it smart enough to require a user to enter a
memorized "wake up" PIN. PINs are familiar to ATM users.
Very sophisticated authentication devices may also have clocks
and multiple self-aging PINs, which change regularly. Tokens
may contain multiple "virtual" identities. (Spender, 1987)
Disadvantages of using token systems include the
financial burden of providing each employee with a hand-held
token, not to mention that workers likely would leave the
devices in their desk drawers, once again breaching security.
If a token is stolen, broken or disabled it may require more
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time then is acceptable before a user can be granted access to
the system (Spender, 1987; Highland, 1990).
Many of today's tokens are vast improvements over
earlier models. To consider their use for all everyday
business operations is as foolhardy as using the same
encryption algorithm for all data. Token are a selective
tool. Each organization has special files and/or systems that
require additional protection; tokens are an effective way to
solve this (Highland, 1990).
C. BIOMETRICS /PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Experimental personal recognition systems have been built
around lip prints, blood-vessel patterns in the retina of the
eye, voice recognition, signature verification, and
electroencephalogram traces (Carroll, 1987; Wilson, 1987).
A person's biometric data tends to be a wholly fixed
password or a way of giving a user a lifetime password.
Problems arise if this device is compromised. For example, if
a user is using a signature verification device and a user's
signature is forged, there is no way for a user to regain
access to his or her signature. It is lost as an
authentication mechanism.
Biometric characteristics are complex, implying large data
transfers between user and host. Protecting these data
between reading device and host is correspondingly more
difficult. The comparisons are automated but statistical,
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opening the system to problems with Type I errors (admitting
the wrong user) and Type II errors (excluding the right user).
The complexity and variability of biometric data also creates
a new type of problem, a user who cannot produce a
satisfactory template for the system to compare against.
Getting computers to recognize people can logically oe
approached two ways; make computers more like people,
equipping them with biometric readers or make people more like
computers, equipping them with personal computerized
authentication devices. The latter strategy seems less
expensive, more secure and more readily implemented at the
present time. iSpender, 1987)
Eecause of this vendors of biometric systems have focused
very heavily on errors in reading and recognizing, on the
cost/performance ratio of their readers and on miniaturization
( Wi lson, 1987;
.
Human characteristics, although measurable, do change
unpredictably. For example, a thumb may be dirty, or have a
cut on it; a user can be hoarse from speaking, or suffer from
laryngitis. Perhaps his eyes are red and his hands are shaky
so neither can be read. Most biometric devices have a
rejection rate in the 4-6 percent range. In a commercial
environment, where you're trying to use this device to
identify customers, that may be unacceptably high.
Overall, this kind of security, provides a reasonable
basis for end-user authentication and the foundation for the
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future implementation of biometrics in open networks. But the
cost for biometric devices can be very high, which is clearly
unacceptable for most applications. (Wilson, 1987;
Biometric devices which have been successfully applied in
commercially available products include:
1. Retina Scanner
The retina scanner bounces an infrared beam off the
retinas of a subject's eye and traces the pattern of distinct
blood vessels. No two individuals have the same pattern, so
this provides identification as precise as a fingerprint
(Kanner, 1990; Parks, 1991).
The capillaries within the eye reflect less infrared
light than the surrounding tissue. What the scanner measures
is the intensity of the reflection at 320 points along the
beam path. A number between and 4,095 is assigned to each
point's intensity.
These numbers are then translated into an 80-byte
computer code to form an "eye-signature." The small amount of
data that his code uses gives the retina scanner an advantage
over other forms of biometric devices, such as those used for
voice prints or finger prints.
By matching the retina pattern code to those stored in
a database, the system can positively identify a person in
less than three seconds. Another plus is that, once users
enroll their eye signatures, subsequent updates are
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unnecessary. Retina patterns don't change as people's voices
and signatures do.
The U.S. Defense and Energy departments have been the
largest users of retina scanners for the last seven years.
Primarily, they're used as stationary physical -access control
systems to weapons facilities and computer rooms. Corporate
America is slowly finding use for them among financial data
centers
.
Retina scanners present a tremendous opportunity for
database security applications. This technology offers the
highest level of security. If it is compared with card-key
systems, there isn't anything that can be lost or stolen.
Users carry their ID with them. Also, if an employee leaves
the company, the locks do not have to be rekeyed
.
A key criterion that any security device must live up
to is an extremely low false-acceptance rate. A user does not
have to identify himse 1 f /herse 1 f to the system beforehand. A
retina scanner can determine by itself if a user is enrolled
in the system. Every other machine needs a PIN, or code, to
know what template by which to compare a user.
The technology could be valuable for tracking insider
computer threats from criminal perpetrators. Retina scanners
can tell which person has accessed a file at a certain time;




Retina scanners provide an audit trail and
accountability that lets the system point out an individual
who may have dene something harmful to the system i.Kanner,
1990;. Retinal patterns have proven to be very effective in
detected attempted impersonation (Holmes et al . , 1990). It's
like ieaving fingerprints at the scene of the crime i Kar.ner
,
1990). In terms of physical-access control, retina scanners
are outstanding (Kar.ner, 1990).
2. Voice Verification Device
Advances in speech processing technology now offer an
attractive and unobtrusive supplement to current security
methods. The wide distribution of microphones in installed
telephones has stimulated the development of user verification
devices exploiting the variation in voice quality from person
to person (Parks, 1990; Penzias, 1990).
With a voice lock, a speaker's own vocal chords act as
the key. By speaking, instead of merely typing, authorized
users allow the voice lock to confirm their identities by
matching the attributes of their voices against the speech
samples stored under their names. (Penzias, 1990)
Imagine a hacker, trying to gain unauthorized access
to a computer system via a dial-up telephone line. Until now,
it has been relatively easy to get a list of phone numbers,
log-ins and commonly used passwords from underground
publications, electronic bulletin boards and similar sources.
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Bad security habits make the gathering of such
information a commonplace fact of life. No matter how hard
system administrators try to increase security, some users
will thwart this effort by using easy-to-remember passwords--
the electronic equivalent of setting a safe's combination to
"0,0,0."
A hacker begins an assault by dialing the first
number; then a personal computer's programmed attack plan can
take over and automatically redial the phone number over and
over as it tries each possible character combination.
But instead of the familiar modem tone, a hacker hears
a voice message: "You have reached port number 6. Please
identify yourself by speaking your name."
Such a response complicates an assault because a
hacker must read aloud from the list on each try or record all
candidate names in advance. Furthermore, even if a hacker
happens to hit upon a valid name (and one whose owner happens
to have a similar accent, age, and gender), the odds against
getting through are about 100-to-l. (Penzias, 1990)
Even if a hacker has somehow obtained a tape recording
of a user's spoken name by eavesdropping on an earlier
session, an assault would then move to the next barrier.
"Please verify your identity by speaking the words,
'Good morning America how are you. 1 " (A randomly selected
sentence is stored in the system's memory.)
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Suppose the voice lock contains its own tape recorder.
The hacker runs the risk of hearing those words played to a
jury someday.
These formidable obstacles do not place any additional
demands upon a legitimate users: he/she must remember his or
her name and use his or her own vocal tracts. Voice locks
offer similar security enhancements at the desktop end as
we 1 1 .
On the hardware side, a voice lock calls for the same
digital signal processor chip platform employed by other
speech processing applications. Such a platform's open
architecture would permft users to tailor applications to suit
their individual needs, or to buy them from software vendors.
Imagine a stand-alone PC equipped with a voice board,
dialer and telephone connection. Potential users could either
dial the PC or access the system directly in whatever manner
they normally use. In the dial-up situation, users can get a
series of voice prompts (when the modem shares a line with the
user's telephone) or begin with a typed request for a log-in.
In the latter case, the logged-in user will be asked
to type the number of whatever telephone happens to be closest
to the user's terminal. The PC then dials that number, which
the user must answer and reply to in a voice-verification
sequence. With the user's identity established, the PC hangs
up the second line and transfers the original line to what
used to be a regular dial-in port before the voice lock was
78
added--us ing the normal transfer features of the local
telephone switch. In addition, that same telephone switch
would presumably limit direct access to the PC's dial-in port.
For systems in which the user's terminal must access
the main system directly from the start, the log-in sequence
triggers a request to the PC (via a hard-wire connection) for
speaker verification. In response, the PC dials the phone
number requested from the user during the log-in procedure and
proceeds to engage the user in a voice-verification dialogue
during the telephone conversation.
Once the speaker's identity has been established, the
PC sends to the main system an okay which allows the typed
sequence to proceed. Because the PC is engaged only during
the verification transaction, a single machine can accommodate
multiple users one after another. Furthermore, such a PC's
capacity can be further enhanced by the addition of multiple
voice boards and dialers, thereby sharing the cost of common
equipment among users. Also, hardware costs might be reduced
even further by incorporating the above capabilities within an
existing system and utilizing whatever components it already
contains
.
What happens when the voice lock does not recognize a
legitimate user? A typical system can be expected to reject
a legitimate user about once in every hundred attempts. That
makes such false negatives about as common as misdialed seven-
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digit telephone numbers. As with telephone dialing (and typed
passwords), a simple retry usually solves the problem.
Adding a voice lock must not cause a burdensome
increase in the number of randomly generated retries. The
need tc type unfamiliar words introduces a higher probability
of random errors than does a typical voice lock system.
Non-random problems are handled the same as with any
other system. For example, if a user has a sore throat, it is
no worse than forgetting your password or leaving your token
at home. In such cases, a user might keep the instructions
for an emergency access procedure locked in a safe place, or
get a colleague to vouch for him/her.
Users whose permanent speech impediments preclude the
use of spoken passwords could train the system with sequences
of tones instead, such as ones produced by a telephone
keyboard. (Penzias, 1990)
3. Finger-Prints
Fingerprint devices are based on measuring the
distance between features in a user fingerprint and storing
this information in a template of some 400-1000 bytes. Low
cost products using this method are available from several
manufacturers, Fingermatrix, Inc., Identix, Inc., and
Thumbscan, Inc. Their prices range from $2000 to $4000 per
unit. Another method is to use line patterns on the palm of
the hand to authenticate a user. (Parks, 1990)
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The fingerprint devices are small and compatible with
desk and portable terminals and have found their best




A system based on the silhouette of the hand was the
first biometric device commercially offered. Several
manufacturers have resurrected the idea and one system is also
using the vertical profile of the hand in addition to the
si lhouette
.
Template sizes vary between 9 and 1000 bytes. Price
per unit range between $3000 and $5000. (Parks, 1990)
5. Signature Dynamics
The use of the written signature is so familiar in
commercial dealing for authenticating documents and for
closing transactions that their use is generally preferred for
automation of user verification in banking transactions
(Parks , 1990) .
Signature dynamic devices all use instrumentation
which measures geometric and/or dynamic properties of the
action of writing a signature in real time and, therefore, at
the point and time of the transaction. Different
instrumentation requires the use of a special stylus connected
to the unit or allow the user to use any convenient stylus.
Devices are currently available from IBM Corp.,
Analytical Instruments Ltd., Digital Signatures, Inc., De La
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Rue Systems Ltd., British Technology Group, Communication
Intelligence Corp., Rolls Royce Business Ventures Ltd.,
T. I.T.N. , Xenetek Corp and others. Templates used in
characterizing signatures range from 40 bytes to 4 kilo-bytes
according to the method used. Unit prices range from $600-
$1200. (Parks, 1990)
6. Typing Rhythms
The timing between pairs of keystrokes in a
typewritten stream of characters has been found to vary
significantly between typists, even those of modest facility.
This approach is unique in being potentially both covert and
continuous, as it can operate on user keystroking in general
use. (Parks, 1990)
This method is software based, possibly with a plug-in
card for PCs and the cost ranges from $500 upwards per
terminal. Uses are clearly for computing and communications
system protection. Commercial sources for typ-ng rhythm
systems include Electronic Signature Lock Corp., and
International Bioaccess Systems, Inc. (Parks, 1990).
Several other biometric techniques that are not yet
available commercially but are in the development stages
include bloodvessels in the hand, facial images, and iris
patterns. Other aspects of the human being which have been
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advanced speculatively as potentially usable for personal
identification have included gait, ear shape, heart and brain
waves. (Parks, 1990)
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VIII. AVAILABLE TOOLS AND PRODUCTS
This chapter will provide the reader a description of how
encrypted password files operate. It will also describe five
different commercial access control software packages used on
IBM operating systems. Other security enhancement software




To validate passwords, a system must have a way of
comparing entries with actual passwords. Rather than trying
to guess a user's password, an attacker may instead target the
system password file.
Encryption of password tables is relied on in many
instances to preclude unauthorized access to a particular
password. The encryption process employed often is not very
sophisticated. For instance, it may involve nothing more than
modification of each password character by the addition or
subtraction of a binary or hexadecimal constant. (Menkus,
1988)
A safe way to avoid the compromise of a password file is
to encrypt the file. Systems have two methods of using
encryption to protect their password information: two-way
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encryption and one-way encryption. With two-way encryption,
the entire password table is encrypted, or perhaps just the
password column, with a secret key when it is stored. Then
when a user enters a password to log-in, the password file
information is decrypted with the secret key, and compared
with the password that was entered. There is still a slight
exposure with this method. For an instant a user's password
is available in plain text in main memory. It is available to
anyone who could obtain access to all memory.
A safer approach uses one-way encryption--an encryption
function for which encryption is relatively easy and
decryption is relatively difficult. The password in the
password table is stored in encrypted form. When a user
enters a password, it too is encrypted, and the encrypted
forms are compared. If the two forms are equal, the
authentication succeeds.
With one-way encryption the password file can be stored in
plain view; in fact, the password table for Unix operating
system can be read by any user, unless special access controls
have been installed. Backup copies of the password tables are
also not a problem. (Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989)
One-way encryption process prevents any form of password
recovery. However, strictly speaking, there is no such thing
as one-way encryption. Use of the term, typically implies
that it is impossible to derive material encrypted by such a
process through known cryptanalytical processes. That is not
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correct. Rather, the encryption process used simply has
raised the cryptanalysis work factor to a very high level,
making it unrealistic, in most instances, to attempt to derive
the password from an attack on the table in which it has been
stored in encrypted form. (Menkus, 1988)
Storing a password file in a disguised form relieves much
of the pressure to secure it. Access may still be limited to
these processes that have a legitimate need for access.
However, securing the contents of the table as well as access
to the table provides a second layer of security. Someone who
successfully penetrates the outer security layer does not get
access to useful information. (Kochanski, 1989)
Because of today's open networks, controls that were
implemented in the past are no longer adequate. They are
still necessary but not sufficient. The old network controls
used point-to-point encryption and the Data Encryption
Standard (DES). These are being replaced by end-to-end
encryption, message authentication, and even new encryption
algorithms. (Wilson, 1987)
B. SOFTWARE/COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS
All access control software packages discussed deal with
three elements: a user, a resource, and an attempt to access.
When the user (which could be a person at a terminal , a
program or a batch job) attempts to access a resource (a
dataset, a transaction, a CICS region, A VM minidisk, or
86
almost any other definable entity), it is the function of the
access control software to determine whether the access is
authorized and should be permitted. (Henderson, 1987)
The five packages described, CA-ACF2 , Omniguard, RACF, CA-
Top Secret, and VMSECURE all run in any IBM or IBM capable
environment
.
1. Access Control Software
a. CA-ACF2
In a CA-ACF2 controlled system, passwords are used
for system entry validation. The user's password is stored in
the CA-ACF2 Logonid database in a one-way encrypted format.
When a user logs on and enters his/her password, it is
immediately encrypted and compared to the stored password. If
they match, access is allowed. An installation can specify
that passwords meet certain requirements:
• Number of invalid tries in a session before the session
will be canceled
.
• Number of invalid tries in a day before Logonid will be
suspended
.
• Minimum character length of the password.
• Whether the user is allowed to change the password.
• The minimum number of days which must pass before a user
can change the password.
• The maximum number of days which can pass before a user
much change the password.
The number of days prior to expiration that CA-ACF2 will
warn the user that the password must be changed.
(Henderson, 1988)
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CA-ACF2 prompts for password entry in display
inhibited screen areas. In a CA-ACF2 system, passwords are
encrypted with a one-way encryption algorithm, using an
extension to DES
.
If a TSO user does not specify a specific Log-cn ID
in the Job Control Language ( JCL) , CA-ACF2 provides for the
automatic inheritance of the Log-on ID of the TSO user.
Access decisions in the batch job will be based upon the
authority of the submitter. No additional password entry is
required, nor must the password be retained in the system or
put in the JCL for these submissions.
Users may change passwords without jeopardizing
previously submitted jobs. Any job submitted before a
password change will be unaffected as CA-ACF2 provides for
automatic ID inheritance without password revalidation.
There are techniques available for administrators
who prefer not to use passwords on JOB cards. An installation
can specify Logonids and passwords in a batch job with special
CA-ACF2 control cards in the JCL called //*LOGONID and
//*PASSWORD. A password submitted in this fashion will be
suppressed at validation, so that it will never appear in a
listing. Also, Log-on IDs can be authorized to run without
the password requirement. This feature provides for ease of
use in a production environment.
When an on-line user first enters a new password it
must be entered twice to confirm that the first entry doesn't
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have any typos. This ensures the user does not make a typo
when changing passwords. This is particularly useful, as all
passwords are entered in non-display fields, and the user
cannot visually inspect what has been entered. (Henderson,
19 3 8'
b . OMNIGUARD
OMNIGUARD encrypts the users' passwords and then
uses a hashing algorithm. Encryption of all passwords is via
DES . The users' passwords are not made available to anyone,
not even a top level administrator. If the password is hard-
coded in the scheme, the OMNIGUARD compiler will return the
output with the password commented out.
Password controls for OMNIGUARD include: the
password must not match the last four passwords, that they be
at least four characters in length, and that the password
contains at least three different characters. The length and
number of different characters may be changed by the security
administrator. It is also possible to force a user to sign on
with two additional passwords that may be up to 256 characters
each in length. Assignment of passwords can be as follows:
user selects his own password, the system administrator
assigns the password or OMNIGUARD can randomly assign a
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password. Additional editing criteria applied to a users
password are
:
Cannot be the same as the user ID.
Maximum and minimum character length can be required.
No more than three characters can be the same.
A time expiration for passwords may be set.
Number of invalid password attempts before a user session
is canceled by either deactivating the terminal or user
identification. (Henderson, 1988)
OMNI GUARD provides the default values cf three
unsuccessful attempts in five minutes. If this occurs, the
system will take the terminal out of service, drop the port,
or deactivate the user's ID (Henderson, 1988).
c . RACF
RACF uses the DES algorithm for encrypting
passwords when stored on its database. RACF also enforces the
installation's defined password standards which include:
Number of consecutive invalid password attempts.
Password value.
Frequency with which passwords must be changed.
Limitations on re-use of old passwords.
User-definition of new passwords. (Henderson, 1988)
There are special controls over passwords that
include length and character composition. Like the Omniguard
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software it is possible to force a user to sign on with two
additional passwords that may be up to 256 characters in
length. Assignment of passwords can be as follows: user
selects his own password, the system administrator assigns the
password or RACF can randomly assign a password.
Once a user's password is entered into the system
RACF insures that the password will not be compromised.
Because the password is one-way encrypted via DES , no means is
provided tc read a password from a user's profile. With TSO/E
Release 3, the password is not kept in memory for TSO
.
Passwords are not displayed on terminals when entered and are
print suppressed to JES output.
When jobs are submitted from TSO a user may supply
a user ID/password on a JOB if desired. If no password is
supplied, the JOB will automatically run under the user ID of
the validated user. Once jobs are submitted, a user can
change his/her password without jeopardizing those previously
submitted jobs.
Passwords are not required to verify that a batch
job properly represents the user it seems to. Validated user
ID propagation by JES2/3 supports entry of batch jobs into the
system without userid/password parameters. In addition, RACF
supports the surrogate user function (via the FACILITY
resource class). This allows a designated user to submit a
job on behalf of another user.
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A common user ID can be used for different systems
and different passwords can be used for each subsystem. If
the RACF dataset is shared there will be one password. If
there are separate systems, each with RACF, the user IDs could
be common but with different passwords. (Henderson, 1988
j
d. CA-TOP SECRET
CA-TOP SECRET provides extensive password controls
to minimize password compromise or guessing. Once entered
into the system user passwords are encrypted on the CA-TOP
SECRET security file. Special controls for user- selected
passwords associated with CA-TOP SECRET include:
• A user may not use any of his/her last three passwords.
• A user may not use a password similar to the last password
used
.
• A user may not change a password more than once per day
(Henderson, 1988 )
.
The installation may optionally specify the
following controls:
• The minimum length of a password
• The minimum number of days during which a user will not be
allowed to change a password after it has been changed
That the user may not use a password equal to his/her
access control ID name or prefixed with information found
in the user's name field
• That only number may be used
• That letters may not be repeated
• That vowels may not be used
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That the user may not change his/her own password
That random password generation is required
That a password mask, or pattern of consonants, vowels, and
numerics must be followed when changing or randomly
generating a password
That a password must contain more than one word making it
mere difficult to guess
That the password may not be prefixed with any entries in
a CA-supplied restricted password list (this list may be
modified to reflect installation standards)
The interval during which warning messages are issued
before a password expires. (Henderson, 1988)
The number of invalid attempts to enter the system
is variable from 1 to 255 occurrences. This feature may also
be deactivated if desired by the installation. Once the
threshold is reached, the user is suspended and can only be
reactivated by an authorized administrator.
There are several options available for deriving
and validating access control IDs (ACID) without requiring JCL
changes or passwords on job cards. If a user submits a job
through any racility, including batch, which uses the internal
reader, CA-TOP SECRET propagates the ACID of the user who
submits the job to the job card without revealing the password
in plain text. If the user submits a job to run under another
user's ACID, CA-TOP SECRET will verify at submit time that the
user has the authority to do so. The installation may also
choose to propagate an ACID that is equal to the job name or
a portion of the job name. A default ACID may be specified
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for each facility. This ACID will be used if an invalid ACID
or no ACID appears on the job card. The installation can
additionally choose to derive an ACID from information on the
job card without requiring the coding of a password. The ACID
can be derived from a specific portion of accounting
information, programmer name, user keyword, job name, or
reader name allowing special ACIDs to be derived for card
readers and RJE/NJE readers. (Hendersn, 1988)
e . VMSECURE
VMSECURE requires the use of a password for log-on
authentication. With full rule-based access, no passwords are
required for minidisks. To prevent compromised passwords,
passwords can be masked so that users and system
administrators cannot see their passwords. If optional
password encryption is implemented, the clear text passwords
cannot be seen even by the system administrator.
Password controls include reuse limiting (can't
reuse any of the last 8 passwords), automatic expiration,
password encryption, number of consecutive invalid attempts
allowed to enter the system, and user exit so a site can
specify additional controls it needs.
When an on-line user first enters a new password it
must be entered twice to confirm that the first entry doesn't
have any typos. This ensures the user does not make a typo
when changi: ; passwords. This is particularly useful, as all
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passwords are entered in non-display fields, and the user
cannot visually inspect what has been entered. (Henderson,
1988;
2. Password Salting
The Unix operating system incorporates an encryption
defense mechanism called "password salting". When a user's
new password is first entered, the password program obtains a
12-bit random number and appends it to the password. The
linked string is then encrypted and both the 12-bit random
number v or salt), and the results of the encryption are stored
in the password file. When a user subsequently logs onto the
system, the 12-bit number is taken from the password file and
appended to the typed password. The encrypted result must
match the encrypted string in the password file. This
modification significantly complicates the work of testing a
given character string, using key search, against a large
collection cf encrypted passwords. Each password now has
4,096 possible encrypted versions. (Gish, 1985)
While the key search method of attack has been slowed
down by the use of DES and the "salt", this technique still
works on most Unix systems. Since the password-based
ciphertext, "salt", and the encryption algorithm are not
secret, key search techniques are limited only by available
computer time to do the encryption and dictionaries used to
provide the guesses. (Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989)
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3 . Upass
The Navy is now testing a new Unix password management
and control product that will give systems administrators
better security controls (Schwartz, 1990).
Unitech Software Inc., produces Upass, a Unix security
package that allows a systems security officer to administer
user account control and maintain a secure Unix environment
without being a Unix programmer. The Navy Military Personnel
Command (NMPC) is testing Upass. (Schwartz, 1990)
Upass gives a system greater security through password
control and automatic reporting procedures that are
transparent to the end users
.
Using Upass, system administrators can make existing
log-in procedures secure enough to meet DOD requirements for
systems that handle classified or sensitive materials. Upass
stores passwords as one-way encrypted data, making it
impossible for anyone to v ^w them. Forgotten passwords
cannot be re-created and user numbers cannot be reassigned,
other than to the original name.
Administrators can receive notice of possible attempts
to penetrate the system in real time. The system can notify
administrators of repeated unsuccessful attempts to log in or
attempts to log-in from a port not authorized to a given user
name .
Upass also provides administrators with a
comprehensive security profile for each user, showing user
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name, number and all security options in effect. It allows
for password changes and log-in history and current password
change status
.
The package lets security officers administer 'iser
account control without having access to root passwords
( Schwartz , 1990 ) .
4. Password Monitors
A password monitor is a program that grades a user's
choice for a password based on how likely it is that the
password could be guesses. Such programs are usually
incorporated into the password changing program, so that when
users try to select a poor password, the system will reject
it.
a. The Password Predictor
"The Password Predictor" is a password monitor
program designed to augment the existing password mechanism
for 4.2 Berkeley Software Distribution (4.3BSD; version of
Unix, by giving the system administrator an automatic
mechanism to monitor the use of trivial passwords. When the
program is executed, it carries out a selective key search on
the password file. The password predictor guesses trivial
passwords and then leaves a message in the user's area. This
compromise of the user's password should encourage him/her to
enter a more complex password since it demonstrates that a
trivial password is easy to guess. The message tells the
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user, "Your password is NOT secure". The program uses several
lists of guesses that include:
• frequently used words from, the system dictionary
• common names and nicknames
• a large sampling of the most frequently spoken and
written six to eight character English words"
• strings from the comment field of the system password file
• miscellaneous names, including streets, music groups, and
cities
• personalized guesses"; "trivial passwords a user is known
to have used in the past". (Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989)
Use of the password predictor will heighten
password security awareness and result in passwords being
composed from a richer character set. It does not
inconvenience the user by forcing him/her to choose an obscure
password; it just demonstrates the importance of having one.
The 4.3BSD system has a simple password monitor
that can be avoided. No password guessing program is provided
with the standard password mechanism software (Carroll et al .
,
1988; Jobusch and Oldehoeft, 1989).
b. Password Coach
Another example of a commercially available
password monitor is Password Coach. It is a completely
transparent unless users choose a weak password. Users
continue to choose their own passwords, so their passwords
will continue to be easy to remember. It screens these
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passwords to make sure that they are not in the dictionary;
common first names; biographical names; geographical names;
technical, medical , or legal terms; keyboard scales (for
example asdfghjkl); account names; or other easily guessed
character strings. If a user chosen password is weak,
Password Coach provides the user immediate feedback on
specific reasons why it is weak and then asks the user to
enter another. Users quickly learn how to construct strong
passwords because the program provides explicit reasons why
passwords are weak. Password Coach comes with a dictionary of
over 140,000 American English words. Each word constitutes a
weak password. Optional dictionaries include several other
languages. The software also allows organizations to define
their own forbidden weak passwords. For example, user names,
job title, social security numbers, telephone numbers
addresses, and other "words" defined as weak. (Wood, 1990)
Password monitoring programs have the same effect
on users as password generators. If the monitor programs
accept only random characters as passwords, users will not be
able or willing to commit the password to memory, and will
instead write them down. Allowing these programs to accept
rememberable passwords, while discarding obvious ones, is the
key to a successful monitoring program. (Jobusch and
Oldehoeft, 1989)
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IX. PASSWORD USE IN THE MILITARY
The military has always taken for granted the overriding
importance of security. They are particularly concerned about
preventing leakage of information, and have tended to see
computer security largely in terms of the control of access tc
classified documents (Wilkes, 1990).
In August 1983, the Department of Defense Computer
Security Center published CSC-STD-001-83 , Department of
Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria. This
publication defines and describes feature and assurance
requirements for six hierarchical classes of enhanced security
protection for computer systems that are to be used for
processing classified or other sensitive information. A major
requirement common to all six classes is accountability. (DoD
Password Management Guide, 1985)
The trusted computer system evaluation criteria described
in the Appendix applies primarily to trusted, commercially
available automatic data processing systems. They are also
applicable to the evaluation of existing systems and to
specification of security requirements for ADP system
acquisition. Included are two distinct sets of requirements:
1) specific security feature requirements; and 2) assurance
requirements. The specific feature requirements encompass the
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capabilities typically found in information processing systems
employing general-purpose operating systems that are distinct
from the applications programs being supported. However,
specific security feature requirements may also apply to
specific systems with their own functional requirements,
applications or special environments (e.g., communications
processors, process control computers, and embedded systems in
general). The assurance requirements, on the other hand,
apply to systems that cover the full range of computing
environments from dedicated controllers to full range
multilevel secure resource sharing systems. (DoD Trusted
Computer system Evaluation Criteria, 1985)
A. MILITARY ENVIRONMENT PASSWORD USAGE
Passwords are used to prevent people who have physical
access to an ADP system from gaining access to data belonging
to another user. Thus, a password should be protected in a
manner that is consistent with the damage that might be caused
by its exposure to someone who has the opportunity to use it
(i.e., has physical access to the ADP system terminals).
Exposure of a password to someone who is physically prevented
from attempting to use it is not a threat.
1. Systems Containing Only Unclassified Information
Although an ADP system may process only unclassified
information, it still may require that the data be protected
from unauthorized use. Although the password is unclassified,
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the obligation remain: hat the user protect this password so
that only those with a need-to-know can access the data.
2. Systems Containing Classified Information
Passwords that are used in ADP systems that operate in
the dedicated or system high security modes should not be
classified, but should be protected to the same degree as For
Official Use Only information. In this case, there is no need
to classify passwords since access to the area in which the
system resides is restricted to those with a clearance as high
as the highest classification level of the information
processed. A person who obtained a password for a system
running in dedicated or system high security mode but who did
not possess the proper security clearance would be unable to
gain physical access to the system and use the password.
For systems operating in the multilevel security mode,
passwords may or may not have to be classified.
When the ability to access classified information is
based on the physical protection of the terminal rather than
on the identity of the user (i.e., when all terminals are
single-level devices), passwords should not be classified, but
should be protected to the same degree as For Official Use
Only information. There is no need to classify passwords that
can only be used on single-level terminals, since physical
access to single-level terminals is controlled to the level
associated with the terminal. When the ability to access
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classified information is based on the user's identity and is
not restricted by the level of the terminal (i.e., multilevel
terminals), each password must be classified to the highest
level of information to which it provides access.
when multilevel terminals are used, the system
determines the user's access authorizations to classified
material based on his identity, and authenticates the identity
by requiring a password. Thus, the ADP system can protect the
information it processed only to the extent that passwords are
protected. For example, a user with Secret clearance can
access Secret information. Compromise of that user's password
could result in the compromise of Secret information;
therefore, the password would be classified Secret. In the
case of a system with multilevel terminals, disclosure of a
Top Secret user's password to a Secret user would allow the
Secret user to login as the Top Secret user and thus gain
access to Top Secret information. Disclosure of Top Secret
information to someone with only a Secret clearance can cause
exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Since
disclosure of the Top Secret user's password could lead tc
this, the password must be classified Top Secret.
Note that classified passwords must not be used on
terminals that are not authorized for data at the level of the
password (e.g., a Top Secret password must not be used on a
Secret terminal). The presence of both single-level and
multilevel terminals on a system may indicate the need for
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passwords at each security level. At a minimum, an
unclassified password should be available for use on terminals
that: are only authorized for unclassified data. (DcD Password
Management Guideline, 1985)
3. Major Features of DoD Guidelines
Specific areas addressed in the DoD Password
Management Guideline include the responsibility of the system
security officer and of users, the functionality of the
authentication mechanism, and password generation. The major
features recommended in this guideline are:
• Users should be able to change their own passwords.
• Passwords should be machine-generated rather than user-
generated .
• Certain audit reports (e.g., date and time of last log-in)
should be provided by the system directly to the user.
(DoD Password Management Guide, 1985)
B. SIMILARITIES WITH PRIVATE SECTOR USE
Authentication mechanisms are used for the same reasons in
the military environment as they are in the private sector.
They are used to protect some type of privileged information
or data from unauthorized users.
C. DIFFERENCES WITH PRIVATE SECTOR USE
While similarities of password use between the military
and private sector parallel each other the differences are
many .
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The military has certain requirement s that must be met.
In the private sector, if an organization chooses not to use
an authentication mechanism to protect its information then
it's a risk that they choose to make. A military organization
does not have that option, if the system meets the criteria
for an authentication mechanism then one must be used in
accordance with current government directives.
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X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
User authentication is an integral part of any IS security
mechanism.. Whiie absolute security seems to be unattainable
iKochanski, 1989J, high degrees of security are commercial iy
available. But they can be inappropriate. When evaluating
various user authentication approaches, a user should consider
how much security the system really needs. In many cases a
traditional password scheme is sufficient. If that does not
provide adequate security, then a combination of a password
and one of the alternative authentication mechanisms might
better suit the organization.
A. TRADITIONAL PASSWORD MECHANISMS
While traditional passwords are the most frequently used
authentication mechanisms (Menkus, 1988), there are many
problems associated with there use: hard to remember, easy to
guess, user resistance, written down, low level of security.
Despite the fact that alternatives to traditional password
mechanisms exist, it seems that most organizations will stick
to traditional passwords. This occurs because traditional
password mechanisms are an integral part of most operating
systems, are readily available, and are inexpensive to
install. Thus, careful attention should be given to their
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selection (use a broad character set, force change after a
period of time) and proper use.
B. ADVANCED PASSWORD MECHANISMS
If an organization desires to improve its present user
authentication method while not advancing beyond passwords,
then an advanced password scheme should be considered.
While passphrases and quest ion-and-answer mechanisms seem
to provide for both ease of memorability and difficulty of
guessing there are still problems with them. Each requires
some type of query system be developed for the computing
system. Also, users may resist having to respond to several
questions at each log-on attempt. However, user
authentication by advanced password schemes provide better
security than traditional password mechanisms. (Smith, 1987:
Zviran and Haga , 1990b; Jobusch et al
.
, 1980)
C. ALTERNATIVE AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS
When advancing beyond a password security mechanism, a
security manager has new options. The sophistication of the
advanced scheme varies and depends on the level of security
required. Another issue that plays a role in selecting an
alternative authentication mechanism are the costs associated
with its implementation.
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Combining what the user knows (i.e. a password) with what
the user possesses (i.e. a token, smart card, biometer device,
etc. ) may provide the ievei of security required.
D . RECOffllENDAT I ONS
While organizations have many options available in the
area of access control user acceptance for any particular
authentication mechanism is needed. The level of access
control to implement is strictly determined within a
particular organization and may be unique to that




The six Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
Divisions and Classes are:
• Division D: Minimal Protection - This division is
reserved for those systems that have been evaluated but
fail to meet all of the requirements for a higher
evaluation division.
• Division C: Discretionary Protection - Classes in this
division provide for discretionary (need-to-know)
protection and, through the inclusion of audit
capabilities, for accountability of subjects and the
actions they initiate.
• Class CI: Discretionary Security Protection - The
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) of a CI system nominally
satisfies the discretionary access security requirements
by providing separation of users and data. It
incorporates some form of credible controls capable of
enforcing access limitations on an individual basis, i.e,
ostensibly suitable for allowing users to be able to
protect project or private information and to keep other
users from accidentally reading or destroying their data.
The class CI environment is expected to be one of
cooperating users processing data at the same level (s) of
security
.
• Class C2: Controlled Access Protection - Systems in this
class enforce a more finely grained discretionary access
control than CI systems, making users individually
accountable for their actions through login procedures,
auditing of security-relevant events, and resource
isolation.
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Division B: Mandatory Protection - The notion of a TCE
that preserves the integrity of sensitivity labels and
uses them to enforce a set cf mandatory access control
rules is a major requirement in this division. Systems in
this division must carry the sensitivity labels with major
data structures in the system. The system developer also
provides the security policy model on which the TCB is
based and furnishes a specification of the TCB. Evidence
must be provided to demonstrate that the reference monitor
concept has been implemented.
Class Bl : Labeled Security Protection - Class Bi
systems require all the features requires for a class C2.
In addition, an informal statement of the security policy
model, data labeling, and mandatory access control over
named subjects and objects must be present. That
capability must exist for accurately labeling exported
information. Any flaws identified by testing must be
removed
.
Class B2 : Structured Protection - In class B2 systems,
the TCB is based on a clearly defined and documented
formal security model that requires the discretionary and
mandatory access control enforcement found in class Bl
systems be extended to all subjects and objects in the ADP
system. In addition, covert channels are addressed. The
TCB must be carefully structured into protection-criticai
and non-protection-critical elements. The TCB interface
is well defined and the TCB design and implementation
enable it to be subjected to more thorough testing and
more complete review. Authentication mechanisms are
strengthened, trusted facility management is provided in
the form of support for system administrator and operator
functions, and stringent configuration management controls
are imposed. The system is relatively resistent to
penetration
.
Clas3 B3 : Security Domains - The class B3 TCB must
satisfy the reference monitor requirements that it mediate
all accesses of subjects to objects, be tamper-proof, and
be small enough to be subject to analysis and tests. To
this end, the TCB is structured to exclude code not
essential to security policy enforcement, with significant
system engineering during the TCB design and
implementation directed toward minimizing its complexity.
A security administrator is supported, audit mechanisms
are expanded to signal security-relevant events, and
system recovery procedures are required. The system is
highly resistent to penetration.
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Division A: Verified Protection - This division is
characterized by the use of formal security verification
methods to assure that the mandatory and discretionary
security controls employed in the system can effectively
protect classified or other sensitive information stored
or processed by the system. Extensive documentation is
required tc demonstrate that the TCB meets the security
requirements in all aspects of design, development and
implementation.
Class Al : Verified Design - Systems in Ai are
functionally equivalent to those in class B3 in that nc
additional architectural features or policy requirements
are added. The distinguishing feature of systems in this
class is the analysis derived from formal design
specification and verification techniques and the
resulting high degree of assurance that the TCB is
correctly implemented. This assurance is developmental in
nature, starting with a formal model of the security
policy and a formal top-level specification ( FTLS ) of the
design. In keeping with the extensive design and
development analysis of the TCB required systems in
class Al , more stringent configuration management is
required and procedures are established for securely
distributing the systems to sites. A system security
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